By 2014 Vladimir Putin was experiencing a decline in his approval ratings due to a stagnant economy, entrenched corruption, and fixed elections which guaranteed his presidency and political support. The Russian people were growing restless. From 2011 – 2013, there were numerous public protests. These cut to the core of Putin’s greatest fear, the potential for being overthrown by a mass movement inspired by people marching in the streets. He had witnessed one of these firsthand while stationed in Dresden, East Germany in 1989 as a KGB officer. Fears that the same thing could happen in Russia meant that Putin needed something besides sending out the riot police to keep public sentiment on his side. Repressive measures would not turn Russian people in his favor. He needed to boost his popularity. The Kremlin searched for a cure to what ailed Putin’s approval ratings. Reform was out of the question. Free and fair elections were a non-starter. Putin was not looking to cede power, he wanted to solidify it.
Little Green Men – Russian forces at a Crimean military base in 2014 (Credit: Anton Holoborodko)
Russian Restoration – Gaining Leverage
Putin had already been in office for nearly a decade and a half. His regime was starting to evoke comparisons with the Brezhnev era in the Soviet Union. A time when the communist system became ossified. Russian history looked like it was stuck on repeat. The bandit capitalism of the Yeltsin era with oligarchs reigning supreme had turned into state capture by securocrats under Putin. Stagnation permeated the Russian government and economy. Putin was in a predicament. The system he constructed had brought stability to Russia and relative prosperity to a middle class that was enjoying western goods, international travel, rising living standards, and financial security for the first time. Russia was also stepping back on the international stage. Putin aimed to restore its great power status. He leveraged the nation’s vast oil and gas resources to tie Europe – most prominently Germany – to Russia.
All of this would have been unthinkable in the chaotic 1990’s which followed upon the Soviet Union’s collapse. During that time, pensioners had been reduced to bartering, the ruble collapsed, and economic hardship was pervasive. The post-Soviet economy was a roller coaster ride with many more downs than ups. Criminality was rife with mafia staking out their terrain. The average Russian did not feel financially secure or personally safe. Putin had put a stop to all that. He was the strongman who was restoring Russian greatness. The people once again had a sense of pride. This made him popular up to a point, but like any leader who overstays his welcome, public disenchantment was growing. The economic and societal gains Putin’s regime brought to Russia were slowly being eroded by the same system that had engendered stability. Putin worried that any attempt at reform would undermine the system he and his closest confidantes benefitted from the most. What Putin needed was a win. One that would make the Russian people forget about the interminable economic and political problems.
(Credit: kremlin.ru)
Up In Arms – The Crimean Solution
Crimea had been a thorn in the Kremlin’s side since the Soviet Union collapsed. Russian nationalists could not stomach the fact that it had ended up in Ukraine. This was due to what they deemed an unthinkably foolish decision by the bumbling Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. There was also the chronic problem of Ukraine which by the winter of 2013-2014 was once again rearing its ugly head. The Orange Revolution in 2008 was bad enough, but the Euromaidan that winter ended up getting Putin’s favorite puppet and Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovych, ousted from power. Yanukovych had been forced to flee with tail between his legs into the arms of the Kremlin. This was additional confirmation to Putin that public protests could turn into a mass uprising.
To make matters worse, Ukraine was becoming a viable, westward leaning democracy. The ouster of Yanukovych had begun because he turned away from an association agreement with the European Union due to threats and inducement from the Kremlin. Putin’s strongarm tactics ended up backfiring when Ukraine revolted. With Yanukovych no longer in power, the Kremlin’s influence over Ukraine would now be lacking. Meanwhile, Putin was now facing dissension at home and democracy on his western border. Something had to be done. The question was what? Taking Crimea and providing military support for Russian separatists in the Donbas turned out to be the answer.
Back in the day – Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Credit: Amitchell125)
Little Green Men – Occupational Therapy
Mass protests might be what Vladimir Putin fears the most, but that has not always been true. Putin has been known to use them to his own benefit at times. This was exactly what happened in Crimea. After Yanukovych was run out of Kyiv, pro-Russian protests began to occur in Crimea. There is little doubt that the Kremlin helped stimulate them. Nevertheless, many Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in Crimea had a longstanding affinity for Russia. The peninsula had also long been a favored retirement spot for Russian military officers. There was enough pro-Russian sentiment that the Kremlin could build upon it. This gave Putin the impetus to capture Crimea in order to protect the rights of Russians from the supposedly malevolent intentions of those who had run Yanukovych out of the country.
On February 27, 2014, the Kremlin sent in what became known as “little green men”. These were forces lacking any official insignia of the Russian military. They captured the most important strategic points throughout Crimea. A pro-Russian government was then installed. Only two and a half weeks after Russian forces entered Crimea a referendum was held resulting in its independence from Ukraine. A couple of days after that, Russia formally annexed the peninsula. Crimea had been taken with scarcely a casualty, but this turn of events sent shockwaves through the geopolitical community. Part of a sovereign nation’s territory had been taken away. This was a throwback to annexations by Hitler’s Germany that led to the Second World War. The Russian annexation of Crimea was reopening a geopolitical Pandora’s Box which threatened to unleash the demons which beset Europe during the first half of the 20th century. Putin could have cared less. Restoring Crimea to Russia sent his approval ratings into the stratosphere. The annexation was wildly popular with the Russian people. By Putin’s standards, Crimea might have been his greatest success. Now with Ukrainian force threatening it eight years later, it could end up as his greatest failure.
Click here for: Gathering of a Ukrainian Storm – The Importance of Crimea #3 (The Russian Invasion of Crimea #271)
Europe Between East And West 