Two Faced – The Decline & Fall of Sergei Surovikin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #354c)

Sergei Surovikin has always had a presence about him. You could see it, even from thousands of kilometers and an ocean away. He looked brutish and unsparing, as though he was at his happiest while pummeling an insignificant conscript into submission. There is chauvinism and then there was Surovikin. His hulking presence, grim scowl, and thuggish demeanor made quite an impression. That always seemed to be the point. Intimidate and obliterate. A butcher who enjoyed the application of overwhelming force, preferably against civilians. Surovikin did not smile, he smirked. The problem with this image of Surovikin, was that he looked like a serious man in a rather ridiculous way.

With his egg-shaped head that blended seamlessly into a perpetually glowering facial expression, Surovikin bore a striking resemblance to a cartoonish movie villain or a past his prime pro wrestler. His affectation of self-conscious toughness was either extremely frightening or a fallacy depending upon one’s perspective. Surovikin looked incredibly sinister, until you noticed the perpetual pudginess. For all his swagger, there was always something rather absurd about Surovikin. He was the living, breathing embodiment of a caricature. The tough guy who seems too menacing to be true. Surovikin’s persona screamed that he would not go down without a fight and planned to take everyone else with him. That is what he wanted everyone to believe. Most did until late June. That was when it became apparent that Surovikin did live up to his cultivated image. He went down without a fight. That is unless you count a bizarre cameo appearance he made during the Prigozhin Mutiny.

Keeping a low profile – Sergei Surovikin and his wife together

Photo Finishes – Missing Person’s Report
There are two recent images of Surovikin which will be hard to forget. That is because these are the only images of Surovikin known to exist between June 24th and September 4^th. These are likely to be among the last images we see of him. For a military man whose hulking figure loomed over the Ukraine-Russia War not so long ago, Surovikin’s vanishing act is symptomatic of his decline and fall. While Surovikin is one of many Russian military commanders to fall out of favor with the Kremlin during the war, he may end up being the most important. Surovikin was competent in military matters. The same cannot be said when it comes to mutiny. The last two images of Surovikin are reflections of this. The first shows a man on the edge. A commander using his position of authority to impress upon Russia’s rank and file the need to stay loyal.

The second image shows Surovikin transformed. He looks like he is on an extended vacation. A diminished figure searching for anonymity, but try as he might, his sizable figure still makes him noticeable. The contrast between the two is telling. What is even more fascinating is that these photos connect the flipsides of Surovikin’s fate. In a matter of six and a half months he went from supreme Russian commander in Ukraine to a missing person. On June 24^th, Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenary forces walked right into Russia’s Southern Military Headquarters in Rostov-on-Don without firing a shot. They were on a mission to remove Valery Gerasimov, the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, and Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of Defense. Not finding either of them there, they proceeded to head north towards Moscow.

Mutiny on the Don – Yevgeny Prigozhin & Wagner forces at Southern Military Headquarters

Bizarre Behavior – A Guilty Conscious
Amid this bizarre mutiny, official sources in Russia released a video of Surovikin calling for Russian troops to stay loyal to the Kremlin. The video’s quality is good, but the presentation is poor. That is due to the woeful acting skills of Surovikin. In the video, he is dressed in fatigues and brandishes a gun while speaking directly to the camera. There was the usual scowl, but something seemed not quite right with him. There is a noticeable tension in his demeanor. Surovikin’s star turn eerily resembles that of Private Leonard in Full Metal Jacket. Specifically, the scene where Leonard is found in the bathroom by one of his fellow soldiers with his rifle locked and loaded. Leonard ends up gunning down his drill sergeant.

Surovikin’s designs in his video were quite different. His later arrest would reveal that Surovikin was privy to information about the Prigozhin Mutiny before it occurred. What exactly Surovikin knew is unknown, but there is little doubt he was trying to save himself with his video. Appearing in the equivalent of a public service announcement in support of the Putin regime did not impress the Kremlin. The video raised suspicions, both in Russia and abroad, the moment it appeared. Surovikin was the only high ranking Russian military commander to film such a message. It was a hapless attempt to look like a loyalist when Surovikin had been acting in his own interests and most importantly, against those of the Kremlin. Soon thereafter, he was detained for questioning and disappeared. In August he was relieved of his position as commander of Aerospace Forces. During this time, various sources stated that Surovikin was either taking a rest or under house arrest. Whatever the case, his role in the Prigozhin Mutiny effectively halted his military career. There was conjecture that Surovikin might soon turn up dead. He certainly would not have been the first Russian commander since the war started in Ukraine, to die in mysterious circumstances. 

Making his case – Sergei Surovikin during the Prigozhin Mutiny

On Permanent Leave – Time Off Award
Surovikin finally reappeared on September 4^th when an image of his wife and him was published on a Russian Telegram channel. This showed Surovikin wearing sunglasses, a denim hat, dressed in casual clothing and looking like he did not want to be noticed. The fierce general now looked like a man on permanent rest and relaxation. If there is such a thing for those who betray the Kremlin. Surovikin was a bit thinner than usual, but otherwise looked to be in good health. Geolocation showed that the photo was taken on the western outskirts of Moscow. One interesting thing to note is that Surovikin reappeared in public after Yevgeny Prigozhin was killed in a plane crash. Prior to that, his whereabouts were unknown. It has been reported that while Surovikin no longer has any active role in the Russian military, he has not lost his rank. His role in the war is most likely over, but for now his life is not. It will be interesting to see whether his decline and fall eventually proves fatal.

Click here for: Victors Die Too – Ukraine Counts The Cost (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #355)

Shoigu & Gerasimov Backstory – The Decline & Fall of Surovikin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #354b)

Vladimir Putin might be lacking in military experience, but there is little doubt that he ascribes to the offensive. After all, he was the one who made the ultimate decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What he termed “a special military operation” was supposed to last only three days. If the whole thing got a little untidy, perhaps it might last a week. Putin, along with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, set Russian forces up for a colossal failure with such a high-speed strategy. The troops were poorly led, badly equipped, and tactically oblivious. The result was defeat in the Battle of Kyiv and a military effort in other parts of Ukraine that enjoyed very little success. This led him to make Sergei Surovikin the commander of all Russian military forces in Ukraine.

Architects of Defeat – Valery Gerasimov & Sergei Shoigu (both in gray) (Credit: Kremlin.ru)

The Internal War – Powers of Persuasion
By October 2022, Russian forces were bogged down on all fronts in Ukraine, Putin then turned to Surovikin in the belief that he would be the cure for what ailed Russian forces. Putin was in dire need of victories. At this point, any victory would do. Morale in the Russian ranks was already low and believed to be sinking further. Surovikin was put in charge of what amounted to a military salvage operation. He had a history of prosecuting brutal military campaigns. Putin expected great things to follow. Surovikin did not live up to expectations. His strategy involved stabilizing the front. This meant going on the defensive, even though such an idea was distasteful and defeatist to the Kremlin. Such a strategy promised a long, cold winter with Russian forces shivering in the trenches. Strategic withdrawal from Kherson and development of a formidable defensive posture along the front were the best Surovikin could do. This did not endear him to Putin.

Meanwhile, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov were prosecuting an internal offensive to retake control of the military by undermining Surovikin. They insinuated themselves back into Putin’s good graces. Their goal was to make Surovikin the odd man out. Shoigu had a huge advantage since he had been one of Putin’s longest lasting cronies. Gerasimov had Shoigu in his corner. Surovikin only had the vocal support of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Though Prigozhin’s Wagner forces were heavily engaged in the fighting at Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, Prigozhin was not part of the regular military hierarchy, nor was he a true Kremlin insider. Prigozhin’s power came from his personal relationship with Putin. While Surovikin and Prigozhin were heavily involved in combat operations at the front, Shoigu and Gerasimov were persuading Putin to put them back in charge. It did not take long for their efforts to prove successful.

Powers of persuasion – Vladimir Putin & Sergei Shoigu meeting (Credit: premier.gov.ru)

Disastrous Duo – Shoigu & Gerasimov
On January 11^th, Surovikin was demoted from commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine. He would now be a deputy to Valery Gerasimov. This demotion must have stung. Three months was hardly enough time for Surovikin to prove himself, but by any reasonable standard of military strategy, he had done a competent job. His replacement was the complete opposite. Gerasimov was widely perceived in the West as a Kremlin flunky. The kind of loyalist who owes his position more to connections than merit. Gerasimov and Shoigu had been thick as thieves for years. Judging by the corruption that hollowed out much of the Russian military prior to the war, they were both extremely well versed in theft. What they were not well versed in was sound military strategy. Shoigu was never a career soldier. He has presided over massive corruption as Minister of Defense. Gerasimov’s entire career has been spent in the military with few notable successes. Many blamed him for the botched initial invasion that bogged down north of Kyiv. It had his fingerprints all over it.

If Vladimir Putin was the architect of the geopolitically disastrous decision to launch the full-scale invasion, Gerasimov and Shoigu were the architects of the initial military debacle. Now they were back in charge with Putin’s blessing after the demotion of Surovkin. The duo might not be able to formulate a winning strategy against Ukrainian forces, but they did win the internal battle in the Kremlin for control of the military. Surovikin was not aggressive enough during his three-month tenure as the overall commander. For the sake of the Russian military’s continued viability in the war, Surovikin could not afford to be overly aggressive. That was why he withdrew Russian forces from Kherson and implemented a defense in depth strategy. Surovikin’s reputation as a butcher did not extend to his own forces.

The upshot was that Shoigu and Gerasimov used Surovikin’s strategically sound decisions against him to regain control. This also dealt a blow to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner Group who was a fervent supporter of Surovikin. Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenaries were also left on the outside looking in. This would be true even after Wagner’s forces secured one of the few Russian victories of the war at the Battle of Bakhmut. The results of this effort, just like Surovikin’s work on developing defensive lines. were enjoyed by Gerasimov and Shoigu. Prigozhin was furious that Wagner did not get the credit he felt they deserved. Surovikin stayed silent and appeared to be the loyal deputy. He must have been seething with discontent. As for Gerasimov and Shoigu, after being put back in charge they attempted an offensive. This only succeeded in getting more Russian forces killed and valuable equipment captured or destroyed.

Less than dynamic duo – Vladimir Putin & Sergei Shoigu (Credit: Mil.ru)

Turning Point – Readying For Revolt
The offensive was another in a long line of poorly conceived and executed military operations. The only thing it accomplished was satisfying Putin’s need to be on the attack. Once again, the Russian military had failed in Ukraine. What made this time worse was the fact that Gerasimov and Shoigu were repeat offenders. Prigozhin could not disguise his anger. He repeatedly made incendiary remarks directed at both Shoigu and Gerasimov. He would have liked nothing more than to see both replaced, perhaps with Surovikin. Unfortunately, Shoigu and Gerasimov had Putin on their side. This was an insuperable barrier unless something drastic happened. That something turned out to be the Prigozhin Mutiny.

Click here for: Two Faced – The Decline & Fall of Sergei Surovikin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #354c)

Invisible Man – The Decline & Fall of Sergei Surovikin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #354a)

Now you see him, now you don’t. That pretty much sums up Sergei Surovikin’s role in the Ukraine-Russia War. After making a cameo appearance during the Prigozhin mutiny he disappeared from public view for over two months. This past week, Surovikin finally reappeared looking less like a soldier and more like a man on an extended vacation. His fall from one of the most powerful positions in Russia has been abrupt. It all started last October when the man known as “General Armageddon” was selected by Vladimir Putin to be the commander of all Russian military forces in Ukraine. Surovikin was lauded as a long-sought savior who would correct the Russian military’s numerous deficiencies in Ukraine.

Surovikin’s reputation for ruthlessness preceded him. He had made the enemies of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad scream for mercy and then responded by showing them none. Surovikin had left a trail of carnage and ruin behind in Syria that gave him a well-deserved reputation as a menacing brute. He looked the part as well with his shaved head, perpetual scowl, and hulking physique. The Kremlin wanted Surovikin to bring the same type of sadistic determination to bear on the war in Ukraine. There was an expectation that Surovikin’s appointment would finally turn the war in Russia’s favor as he bent the battlefield to his will. There was only one problem, Surovikin’s tenure was much like everything else in Russia’s war against Ukraine, it did not go as planned.

Reputation for Ruthlessness – Sergei Surovikin

Strategic Retreat – A Calculated Withdrawal
When Surovikin took command, he inherited a mess. Russian forces were in an untenable position west of the Dnipro River in and around the city of Kherson. They were slowly being surrounded by Ukrainian forces which were continuously moving forward. A siege looked inevitable. With bridges over the Dnipro threatened with destruction, Russian forces risked being cut off. Surovikin assessed the situation and decided the only way Russian forces would live to fight another day was by withdrawing to the east bank of the Dnipro. This was controversial because Russian forces would be surrendering Kherson. Surovikin might have had a reputation as a butcher, but unlike others in the Russian high command he was also competent. This was the only viable strategy if Russia wanted to preserve some of its most experienced troops. 

Surovikin was able to convince Vladimir Putin to allow a withdrawal to the east side of the Dnipro. This was carried out flawlessly. By the extremely low standard set by Russian troops in Ukraine, the operation was one of their best. The problem was that the Russians were retreating and leaving behind the only capital of a Ukrainian province they had managed to occupy since the invasion began. If the war taught both sides one thing, it is that once a piece of territory is lost, taking it back requires a massive sacrifice of men and material.  Retreat was not something the Kremlin had in mind when they first invaded Ukraine, nor when they put Surovikin in charge of Russian military forces.  From Surovikin’s perspective, he was working to stabilize an untenable situation. Russia had already suffered its greatest loss of the war that September when Ukrainian forces broke through Russian lines in the Kharkiv Counteroffensive and routed them. Surovikin knew that Russian forces could not afford to suffer another defeat of that magnitude again.

Frontal assault – Sergei Surovikin & Vladimir Putin

Cannon Fodder – In The Line of Fire
Surovikin’s efforts did not endear him to the Kremlin. The duo most culpable for Russian defeats in Ukraine, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov saw an opportunity to insinuate themselves back into leading the Russian military. Surovikin had put his stamp on Russian military operations in Ukraine, but he would be demoted in January, only three months after his appointment as overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Surovikin was subordinated to Gerasimov, who along with Sergei Shoigu have been the architects of defeat throughout the war. This did not matter because Gerasimov and Shoigu are Kremlin cronies whose main accomplishment has been to show blind loyalty to Putin. That matters much more than competence. The Ukrainians had to be breathing a sigh of relief with Surovikin no longer in charge.
  
It is likely that Gerasimov assumed command with a promise to Putin to go on the offensive before Ukraine could begin their own counteroffensive in the spring. Shoigu, who has very limited military experience, would have encouraged this as well. A Russian offensive went ahead with predictably poor results. They made few gains, while incurring large losses. The lone bright spot was the Battle of Bakhmut. The overwhelming majority of the fighting at Bakhmut was done by Wagner mercenary forces whose leader Yevgeny Prigozhin guaranteed a victory. Success cost Wagner thousands of former prisoners turned soldiers who were used as cannon fodder. Wagner forces eventually secured a victory, but in the process were left decimated.

Dictatorial designs – Vladimir Putin, Bashar Assad & Sergei Surovikin (Credit: Milru)

Isolated & Infuriated – Common Cause
Prigozhin had previously been complimentary of Surovikin’s appointment when he had been selected as overall commander of Russian forces. Prigozhin knew Surovikin from their time together in Syria where Wagner forces were heavily involved in the fighting. Prigozhin loathed Gerasimov and Shoigu, more so after Wagner forces got cut to pieces at Bakhmut. Prigozhin believed that Gerasimov and Shoigu purposely held back support for Wagner troops. Refusing to supply them with ammunition and ensuring that Russian forces took a step back during the battle. Prigozhin’s collection of prisoners and guns for hire had done most of the dirty work. Bakhmut was a Wagner victory, more than a Russian military one. Gerasimov and Shoigu were not about to give Prigozhin credit. The latter was infuriated. He began taking verbal shots at Gerasimov and Shoigu. As spring went on, Prigozhin’s comments turned increasingly vicious. At some point during this time, Prigozhin and Surovikin made common cause. Whenever that happened their fates became inextricably intertwined in what would become one of the most bizarre episodes of the entire war.

Click here for: Shoigu & Gerasimov Backstory – The Decline & Fall of Surovikin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #354b)

The Self-Preservationist – Post-Prigozhin Putin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #350)

One thing in Russia has become completely apparent over the past week, Vladimir Putin is more committed to winning the internal political war at home, than he is with winning the war in Ukraine. There is a very good reason for this. The war in Ukraine is not winnable for Putin. Even if there is some sort of negotiated settlement in the distant future, Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine will go down as one of the worst geo-political miscalculations in Russian history. That is really saying something because the competition is fierce. The closest equivalent in 20^th century Russian history is the Russo-Japanese War, an ill-fated adventure that resulted in much of the Russian fleet’s annihilation at the Battle of Tsushima, the 1905 Revolution, and the irreparable weakening of Tsar Nicholas II’s power.

Taking orders – Sergei Surovikin saluting Vladimir Putin (Credit: mil.ru)

Fatal Mistakes – The Internal Battle
Vladimir Putin is challenging the last Tsar’s aptitude for poor decision making. Putin’s decision to go all in on the war with Ukraine has cost Russia a million men, either by death on the battlefield or immigration. The war has weakened Russia for at least a generation and made it a client state of China. Russia is more diplomatically isolated than it has been at any time since the Soviet Union collapsed. Whoever succeeds Putin will inherit an unstable Russia riven with factions that will have no other recourse than to settle political disputes by force of arms. Post-Putin Russia will be a disaster waiting to happen.

In the meantime, Putin is fighting a rearguard action to stabilize his regime. The war in Ukraine was and still is one of choice. Conversely, Putin has no other choice except to wage his own internal political war in Russia. To do otherwise would be a fatal mistake. This war is a matter of life and death for him. There is no such thing as retirement or internal exile for Putin. The system he has created only has room for one leader. That will be Putin, until it is not.

Self-preservation is the motivating factor in Kremlin decision making right now. Putin is doing everything possible to ensure he stays in power. Curiously, the assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin and removal of General Sergei Surovikin from command exposes Putin’s weakness, rather than reinforces his strength. If Putin felt sure of himself and the stability of his regime going forward, then he would have no need to eliminate perceived rivals.

Prigozhin should never have been a threat, but Putin allowed him to get out of control. It was not so much the mistreatment of Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenaries by the Russian military high command that stimulated the mutiny. Instead, it was Putin’s dithering that allowed the situation to worsen for months until what should have been an internal political matter exploded into the open. This shook the regime to its foundations. The fallout will be long and violent. In the near term this will mean surgical purges. Putin will exact vengeance on those who were disloyal to him. 

Another one down – Yevgeny Prigozhin

Presumed Guilt – Matters of Suspicion
Putin is not interested in reform or suggestions for improvement, he is interested in staying in power. All of Russia’s war goals are subjugated to this desire. Priority #1 for Vladimir Putin is Vladimir Putin. Everything inside the Kremlin is subjugated to this. The same goes for the war effort. Putin has made himself the living embodiment of Russia. Anyone who does not realize this and acts accordingly is involving themselves in potentially traitorous activity. Putin is not asking anyone to choose sides, he has already made the choice for them. Support Putin or else. Those Russian elites who were increasingly lukewarm in their support of the Kremlin have now been warned of the consequences for opposition. They already knew this, but just in case anyone might have forgotten Putin has just offered a couple of prime examples.

Interestingly, the most instructive measure of Putin’s vengeance is the removal of Surovikin as head of Russia’s aerospace forces, rather than the assassination of Prigozhin. In retrospect, the latter’s murder was a foregone conclusion. The only thing shocking was that it took 60 days. Prigozhin was given a predictable death sentence for disloyalty. Helping expedite matters was the fact that he had long since ceased to be of use to the Kremlin. Prigozhin and the Wagner Group had outlived their usefulness. The Battle of Bakhmut was their Waterloo.

On the other hand, Surovikin had been effective throughout much of the war. Though he was relieved earlier this year as the top commander of Russian forces, he still held a high ranking and influential position. Surovikin implemented defense in depth tactics that have allowed Russian forces to slow Ukraine’s counteroffensive. In sum, Surovikin was competent and that is the highest compliment that can be paid to a bad bunch of Russian military commanders.

None of this now matters, as Surovikin was removed from his command post and designated persona non-grata. He is suspected of supporting Prigozhin’s mutiny. That is likely true, but the chilling aspect of Surovikin’s fall for Russian elites is that his crimes have not been made explicit. The message being transmitted by the Kremlin is that suspicion is tantamount to guilt. That means anyone could fall foul of the authorities. If it could happen to someone as valuable to the Kremlin as Surovikin, then everyone is fair game. In this environment, guilt is presumed while innocence is impossible to prove.

Top Priority – Preserving Putin
The focus on self-preservation and potential purging of the disloyal will help Putin reimpose his authority, but it is distracting from the Russian war effort at a crucial point in the conflict. The Ukrainian counteroffensive has been much less successful than many assumed, but over the past several weeks it has gained momentum. Ukrainian forces are creeping southward. They have broken through at least one line of Russian defenses. If the Ukrainians continue to make headway before the autumn rains, they could bring Russia’s access to Crimea within range of their artillery. That would be a major blow to the Russian’s ability to resupply their forces. That is something the Russians cannot afford to let happen, but this is not their top priority. The war in Ukraine comes second, Vladimir Putin staying in power comes first. That is a problem for the Russians. One without a solution. At least, not yet.

Click here for: A Place In History – Pskov Returns To War (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #351a)

The Closing Chapter – Putin, Prigozhin & A Change In Fortunes (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #349b)

The assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin was a necessary power play by Vladimir Putin. He is reimposing his authority and further solidifying his dictatorial rule over Russia. This does not mean Putin has rid himself of threats. That is because the greatest threat to Putin’s regime is Vladimir Putin. His epically bad decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine 18 months ago, followed by mismanagement of the war effort has shaken his regime to its core. Now that he has rid himself of Prigozhin, Putin is likely to continue purging anyone he suspects of disloyalty. His role in the war effort has crystalized with the removal of pro-Prigozhin general, Sergei Surovikin last week.

Both Prigozhin’s death and Surovikin’s removal have been disseminated to the public. This is about as transparent as the regime gets. The Kremlin is sending a clear message to the Russian elite and public. Putin is in charge. It is his way or the cemetery. An unintended side effect of these latest moves will be that Putin will shoulder the blame for future mistakes. No one in Russia is under any illusions about who is running the war. It is Vladimir Putin, for better and worse. This may be a portent of greater troubles to come for Putin and Russia.

Novel idea – Russians hanging around in Rostov-On-Don during Prigozhin mutiny
(Credit: Fargoh)

Do Or Die – The Putin Predicament
If there is one thing Russian elites will learn from the assassination of Prigozhin and the two top Wagner Group leaders who went down in flames with him, it is that anyone who openly opposes Vladimir Putin better be prepared to go all the way. Even Prigozhin, who seemed to sidestep fate, did not last very long. Plotting against Putin is a classic do or die predicament. The barriers to success are huge. Anyone hoping to emerge victorious from an attempted coup must gain control of the government. Otherwise, all they will have accomplished is getting themselves a death sentence.

The problem for any would-be plotters is that Putin has the entire Kremlin under his thumb. Those who work there do so at Putin’s leisure. They owe their entire livelihoods to him. The same can be said across all of Russia for those who hold powerful economic, military, or political positions. Until someone else can offer a better alternative, Putin will stay in power. Right now, there is no alternative. Prigozhin never really offered one either.

A not so well-kept secret is that Prigozhin was not seen as a viable leader by those who have their doubts about Putin. While Prigozhin’s vulgarity was seen as disgusting in the west, Russian elites must have been terrified. A man who brags about someone getting their head smashed in with a sledgehammer and posts videos standing in front of his own soldier’s corpses, is not the kind of person Russian elites are likely to trust with their future.

Seeds of demise – Wagner Group cemetery in Tyumen Russia (Credit: RG72)

Casting Doubts – Prigozhin’s Fatal Flaws
Compared to Prigozhin, Putin is a consummate professional. He plots the downfall of his adversaries in a calculating manner, then has them disposed of in ambiguous circumstances. This sends the appropriate message without Putin getting his hands dirty. Prigozhin cast doubts by advertising his sadism. He could not hide his thuggish nature. If anything, Prigozhin reveled in it. Even in a Russian society where might makes right is the ruling ethos, he was more than anyone cared to deal with. If Putin had trouble handling Prigozhin, imagine how Russian elites must have felt about the possibility of facing off against him. The prospect must have been terrifying.  
Never forget that Russian elites have been able to thrive in Putin’s system. That was not on any of them.

One of the aspects overlooked in Prigozhin’s mutiny was his lack of support. The most astonishing thing that happened during it was the wait and see game Russians played. There was no overt support for Putin, but this distracted from the fact that there was also no overt support for Prigozhin. That is unless you count people cheering on Wagner in Rostov-on-Don after it ended. They were doing so as spectators to a novelty. That kind of support was not sustainable.

Putin may not have had noticeable support, but what he did have was the state’s resources to deal with the threat. Putin also has a track record of dealing harshly with opposition to his regime. He does not suffer betrayal, at least not for long. Prigozhin came as close as anyone to threatening the regime and getting away with it. He got an extra sixty days out of it before Putin had him murdered. Prigozhin only has himself to blame. He spent a large part of his life bolstering a tough guy persona, but he was cowardly when it came to putting his own life on the line. For all the sinister intent of his mutiny, when it really mattered Prigozhin caved in. This was not only the end for him, but also his Wagner mercenary forces.

Into oblivion – Wagner Group forces in Central African Republic

End Results – An Improbable Struggle
Not long after the plane crash was reported, social media was abuzz with Wagner Group mercenaries threatening retaliation. This is implausible. Wagner lost its spiritual, operational, and logistical leaders in the crash. Any kind of coordinated action would be difficult, if not close to impossible. It is often forgotten how much the Battle of Bakhmut hollowed out Wagner’s forces. While many of those they sent into battle were prisoners being used as cannon fodder, these military operations still needed seasoned Wagner soldiers to provide the backbone of the fighting forces. Regular Wagner forces also suffered high rates of casualties in Ukraine.

Prigozhin’s grasp for glory at Bakhmut sowed the seeds of his demise and the Wagner Group. The mutiny was a last-ditch attempt by Wagner forces to remain relevant. Whatever is left of them will either be assimilated into the Russian military. Putin moved quickly on this following Prigozhin’s assassination. Any pro-Prigozhin holdouts stand little chance of survival inside Russa. Their best career move would be to leave for Africa as soon as possible. Even those in Belarus must be wondering what Putin may have planned for them. After all, Belarus’s dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko is in Putin’s pocket and relies upon him for his own survival. Wagner forces are going to become history, just like their leadership.

With the assassination of Yevgeny Prigozhin, a bloody chapter in Russian internal politics is closing. At the same time, a new one is opening. For the time being, Vladimir Putin has further entrenched his authority. He has emerged victorious from an improbable struggle. That struggle was one he created by cultivating Prigozhin’s designs on military glory in Ukraine. This led to Prigozhin’s war against the Russian military’s senior leadership. This was a conflict that Putin allowed to spiral out of control with near disastrous consequences for his regime. He is not likely to make the same mistake again, but as we have seen with Putin’s mismanagement of the war in Ukraine, he is likely to make other mistakes. How those mistakes are handled will decide Putin’s fate and Russia’s future.   

Click here for: The Self-Preservationist – Post-Prigozhin Putin (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #350)

Fighting Themselves – The Real Russian Enemy (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #345)

I often think the only thing Russians fear is themselves. There are numerous instances throughout their history of suicidal behavior on an alarming scale. This was especially true during the 20th century. The examples read like a litany of the worst that humanity has to offer. These include, rushing into World War I with a disorganized army led by a corrupt officer class and a clueless Tsar. Then continuing to fight the war despite millions of casualties and societal unrest. Even after the Tsar abdicated, the provisional government decided to try yet another offensive with predictably disastrous results. It was as though, Russia’s leaders wanted to ensure a successful Bolshevik Revolution. Vladimir Lenin could not have been luckier. He was not nearly as effective as his advisories were incompetent. And this is just one of many examples from the numerous famines, purges, nuclear accidents, military bungling, and misguided adventures at both home and abroad by leaders lacking any sort of moderation. The Russian populace was treated with disdain. In turn, they treated each other with that same lack of compassion. It was a vicious cycle that will ultimately be measured in millions of lives lost.

Carried away – Wounded Russian soldier being transported away from the front

Pulling Triggers – The Cultivation of Catastrophe
The disasters that have occurred with frightening regularity throughout Russian history did not just happen by historical happenstance. In every one of the examples given above, Russians were in the majority of those most intimately involved. They have played the critical role in their own demise time and again. In the Soviet Union, Russians were the dominant ethnic group. The same was true for the Russian Empire. Some might say that this is pinning all the blame on Russians. Well, it is obvious that Russians have a history of blaming themselves. Just look at the violence they perpetrated upon each other during the 20^th century. There are those who try to explain Russia’s disastrous 20^th century by saying it was ultimately the fault of communism or Stalinism. Yet those ideologies built upon something very dark and decadent that already existed in Russian society.

Josef Stalin, ethnically Georgian, may have been a mass murder on an unfathomable scale, but he was not the one pulling the triggers when prisoners were getting bullets in the back of the head. Russians, by sheer weight of numbers were the ones most complicit in Soviet crimes. It should always be remembered that for all the misery Russians have caused other nations, they have caused the most for themselves.  Considering this ill-fated past, it should not be that surprising to discover that the Russian habit of cultivating catastrophe has continued with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian heart is filled with darkness, and they have followed that darkness down into another disaster.

By invading Ukraine, Russia has sowed the seeds of its own demise. By continuing the war, they prolong the agony of defeat. Rather than walk away from the war, the Russians have dug in deeper. They cannot go forward, nor can they go back. Hypothetically they could withdrawal, but politically this is a non-starter. A retreat with nothing to show for it other than 200,000 casualties would almost certainly spell the end of the Putin regime. And even if forced to retreat, the Russians must hold onto the gains they made fighting in the Donbas from 2014 – 2022. To relinquish those would mean that Valdimir Putin’s decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to the loss of territories it already occupied. There would be no way for the Kremlin to evade responsibility for such a result.

Fighting on – World War I poster asking for Russians to send books to their soldiers

Meager Gains – The Wait & See Approach
There is no escape from the mess Vladimir Putin has made for Russia. And what is Putin, but a representation of the worst aspects of the Russian people. Aspects that considering their history, occur all too frequently. It is not surprising that the Russians are stubbornly hanging on in Ukraine despite their poor performance. Conventional logic is that they are waiting for a better result on the battlefield, but there has never been anything conventional about Russia. They might well be waiting for something worse to happen. That is the Russian way, one that has deep roots in the past.

The Kremlin has ordered Russian soldiers to hunker down behind their formidable defensive works. The hope is that time is on their side. Hope never won a war, but it has kept many going. From the Kremlin’s point of view, they need to hang on long enough and Ukraine may be forced to negotiate a peace on more favorable terms to Russia. This seemed like a sensible strategy until the Prigozhin Mutiny exposed massive dissension in the Russian war effort. We should never underestimate the Russian ability to fight as hard among themselves as they do with the enemy. The dissension reflects friction and infighting that threatens to upend the Kremlin’s latest plan to lock in their meager gains. It also shows that the waiting game carries extreme risks for the Putin regime.

The war has only lukewarm public support inside Russia. As the costs continue to rise, along with it come increasingly difficult questions about why they are in Ukraine and how much longer Russian soldiers will be there. The regime is not prepared to answer those questions. Their only response is oppression and propaganda. The problem with repression is that it can lead to pent up pressure that eventually explodes. Propaganda is not much better. It is force fed to the Russian public as a cure for the Putin regime’s crisis of legitimacy. This still does nothing to change the static situation on the Russian side of the front. Every day in the trenches further erodes morale. And there are a lot more days to come in the trenches. Hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers are enduring a soul sapping experience. From their perspective, the war looks no closer to a decisive conclusion.

The wait gets longer – Russian prisoners of war captured in Ukraine

Unresolved Problems – An Elusive Solution
It is often said that waiting is the hardest part. That includes war where the waiting is amplified. Russian soldiers at the front keep waiting for something good to happen, but they probably expect the worst. Why would they not? Russian history shows this is what usually happens. The Russians are involved in an unwinnable war because they are ultimately fighting themselves. This is ultimately a problem that only they can solve. Up to this point in their history, a solution has proved elusive. Just like victory in Ukraine.

Click here for: From Three Days to Three Years – Putin Plays The Long Game (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #346)

Two Times The Terror – The Moscow Drone Strikes (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #337)

If at first you succeed, then try, try again. This twist on the adage of never giving up was put to good use by the Ukrainian military as they carried out a successful drone attack in the center of Moscow on July 30th. Then they quite literally doubled down on those attacks. In a bit of destructive déjà vu, they pulled off the same attack again, on the exact same building, two days later. This was yet another in a long line of embarrassments that the Kremlin has suffered since the war began over 500 days ago. The seemingly endless string of gaffes is usually blamed on the Russian military, but leadership starts in the Kremlin. Where Vladimir Putin leads, the rest of Russia follows. If Putin has no idea what to do, then it is to be expected that those under him will be just as clueless. That filters all the way down to the battlefield, which unfortunately for Putin now extends all the way to Moscow.

Shattered Illusion – Result of Ukrainian drone strike on IQ Quarter in Moscow

Dynamic Duo – Striking Back-to-Back
While there are hundreds of high value targets in the Russian capital, the Ukrainians made a specific choice to hit the same target twice. (The Russians say they electronically jammed the drone in the second attack causing it to strike the same building as before. Considering the Russian’s track record in telling the truth this seems dubious.) In retrospect, their intentions were as obvious as the target. They wanted to send a message and found a unique way of doing it twice. The Ukrainians were brazenly showing that they cannot not be stopped. The attacks made the Kremlin look incompetent at best and defenseless at worst. Muscovites must now be wondering why the Russian military cannot stop the same attack on consecutive days. While the Kremlin must be wondering how they can distract the Russian populace from the obvious fact that the war is now hitting home. Propaganda and disinformation will do nothing to stop the attacks that are sure to keep on coming.

The back-to-back successful drone attacks on the IQ-Quarter skyscraper in Moscow were a master stroke of messaging. The power of these attacks was more psychological than physical. A sporting analogy can help explain their psychological ramifications. In American football, there is nothing more demoralizing to a team on defense, then knowing what the offense is going to do next and being unable to stop it. This is most devastating when it involves the running game. The offense will run the ball play after play. The defense knows exactly what is coming and cannot stop it. The offense marches down the field gaining an average of five yards per play. Eventually, they are in the end zone and score a touchdown. This breaks the defense’s will to resist.

Damage assessment – Result of Ukrainian drone strike on IQ Quarter skyscraper in Moscow

Flaws & Failure – The Kremlin Exposed
In much the same manner, the Russians know the Ukrainians are targeting Moscow with drones. They know the attacks will come under the cover of darkness. They know the attacks will creep ever closer to high value targets. They know the attacks are to sow dissension and doubt in the Russia people’s support for the regime. And the Kremlin knows that is exactly what will happen. That is unless they stop every attack which has been proven impossible. The Russians have tried to do the same thing in their innumerable attacks on Ukrainian cities, but there is one big difference. Ukraine’s political and military leadership has never cultivated the idea of infallibility that Vladimir Putin has throughout his twenty-two years in power. That makes the shock from mismanagement of the war all the greater for Russians. That mismanagement was an abstraction for most of the population when the frontlines were over a thousand kilometers away. That is not the case anymore. The front lines can now be found on every street corner and high rise building in Moscow.

Muscovites no longer wonder if there will be an attack. They now realize it is just a matter of time. Confidence in the regime must be dwindling. If the Kremlin cannot stop attacks on consecutive days at the same place, then what can they stop. This is a rhetorical question that Russians are now asking themselves. Vladimir Putin’s projection of power looks more and more like what it always has been, propaganda and posturing. His public support rests on ever shaker foundations. Putin’s air of invincibility began to dissipate during the Battle of Kyiv. It continued to decline as the war dragged on and Russian forces showed no sign of being anywhere near a decisive victory. The Prigozhin mutiny did incalculable damage to Putin. He is now in the same position as the Russian military, just trying to on and hold out. The regime is on the defensive.

Playing good defense requires a clear plan, excellent organization, sound decision making, and high morale. Politically and militarily the Russians are lacking in each of these, especially where the Kremlin is most heavily involved. The Putin regime has been the main cause behind Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine. Now the Kremlin is faced with major challenges on the domestic front. The Putin playbook does work well in warfare. Cronyism does not cope with problems; it creates more of them. That means the embarrassments and humiliations for the Kremlin will continue. Those two words best sum up what the Russians most have felt when the drone attacks occurred. Putin is not the protector of Russia that his regime has spent the last two decades promoting. Right now, the Kremlin cannot even protect its own capital. The drone strikes are symptomatic of Russia’s underlying vulnerability. The Kremlin never thought it would be defending the homeland. The fact that they are forced to do so is the ultimate indictment of failure in Ukraine.

Damage assessment -Result of Ukrainian drone strike on IQ Quarter skyscraper in Moscow

Mission Creep – Doing Damage Control
Russia’s ability to continue waging the war is not immediately in doubt, but the questions about where all this is leading continue to grow. In the past five weeks, there has been a major internal mutiny, multiple attacks inside Russia, and illegally occupied Crimea is getting hit by Ukrainian strikes every day. Compounding matters is the lack of leadership at all levels. No one knows who is really leading the war effort. The army continues to fight in Ukraine, but their gains have been trivial. The Russian military is in a defensive posture and so is the Kremlin. Damage control has become the only option. The war continues to creep every closer, as do Ukrainian drones.

Coming soon: Managing Expectations – A Question of Time in the Ukraine-Russia War (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #338)

National Insecurity – Ukrainian Attacks & Russian Reactions (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #336)

You can tell a lot about Russia by the way it reacts to a Ukrainian attack. If there is silence, then the Kremlin wants to hide the truth. This is done because otherwise, the regime’s affectations of infallibility might be damaged. If there is outrage, then the attack struck a nerve. The greater the outrage, the more incendiary the rhetoric. The more visceral the reaction, the greater the distraction. Official reactions from the Kremlin are situationally dependent. The bipolarity of Russian reactions was on full display following two Ukrainian attacks on consecutive days last week. One occurred on Ukrainian territory illegally occupied by Russia. The other took place in Moscow, not far from the Kremlin. The reactions were telling. The first reaction would prove that silence is not only deadly, but also destructive. especially when it comes to Crimea. The second attack elicited another vociferous threat from a usual suspect. Both were attempts to hide the truth. Instead, they ended up exposing deep rooted insecurities both on and off the battlefield.

Going nuclear – Dmitry Medvedev

Mute Possibilities – Silencing The Critics
On July 29^th, a Ukrainian aerial attack successfully struck the Chonhar Bridge. The bridge spans the Chonhar Strait, a vital transportation link between Crimea and the Russian occupied part of Kherson Province. While only three hundred meters in length, the Russians will be hard pressed to construct another bridge. The attack was the second successful one on the bridge over the past five weeks. When the first one occurred, the influential community of Russian military bloggers were outraged. How dare the Ukrainians attack infrastructure that supports Russia’s war on the Ukrainian mainland. They called for a swift retaliatory response. There was certainly a response, but it came from the Ukrainians who dealt another destructive blow. This time the Russia military blogger’s reactions were muted. Such conspicuous silence did not go unnoticed. What happened to cause this lack of a reaction?

The situation inside Russia regarding criticism of the war effort has been transformed by the Prigozhin mutiny. The arrest and detention of several critics on the nationalist right who were vocal about their displeasure with the regime’s conduct of the war had a chilling effect. The space for criticism narrowed considerably between the first and second attacks on the bridge. The first attack took place on June 22^nd, just a day before the mutiny began. Since then, the Kremlin has been tightening its control over anyone on the nationalist right who does not toe the party line. A few arrests of well-known figures acted as a warning to anyone who might challenge the official narrative or engage in what the Kremlin deems defeatist rhetoric about the war. Those who previously felt free to criticize the Russian military and at times, the Putin regime, now realize they are risking arrest or perhaps even worse.

Logistical issues – Chonhar Bridge after the latest Ukrainian attack

The Master’s Bidding – Putin’s Puppets
Vladimir Putin must have finally realized that the leniency he had shown towards critics of the Russian military morphed into a mutiny that has irreparably weakened his grip on power. He cannot afford another mutiny. That would likely prove fatal to his regime. He is now taking no chances. And where Putin goes, his henchmen follow. To this end, the Kremlin directed the arrest of Igor Girkin, who also goes by the nom de guerre Strelkov. Girkin had continued to vocally criticize the Russian military, the Kremlin, and even Putin directly. That was until his arrest. He is now being held on charges of inciting extremism and will likely languish in prison as long as Putin stays in power. Girkin’s arrest was a shot across the bow to those who have felt compelled to voice their concerns about the war’s conduct. A direct result of this crackdown according to the Institute for the Study of War (an American based think tank which offers accurate, up to date information about the war and expert analysis) is their silence concerning the Chonhar Bridge. Fanning the flames of failure is no longer allowed by the regime.

Another recent Russian reaction to a Ukrainian attack could not have been more different than the muted one to the Chonhar Bridge attack. In the early morning hours of July 30th, Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow. One struck a high rise building less than five kilometers from the Kremlin. This attack was much too close for the regime’s comfort. This was an attack on the Kremlin, rather than the Russian military. It could also be interpreted as the Ukrainian counteroffensive gaining momentum. This elicited a visceral reaction from the Kremlin’s designated attack dog, Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev was Putin’s hand picked president from 2008 – 2012. He was also a man that many in the west fooled themselves into believing would be a moderating force in the Kremlin. Instead, Medvedev was then, as he is now, Putin’s puppet. He will do his masters bidding. Medvedev loves nothing more than snarling at the West while threatening hell, fire, and brimstone upon Russia’s enemies. Since the war began, he has made a series of incendiary remarks that make the Kremlin’s usual war mongering look mild. This time was no different. 

Muted criticism – Igor Girkin (Credit: Dom kobb)

Fears of Failure – Defeatist Rhetoric
Following in the wake of the drone attack, Medvedev said that if the Ukrainian counteroffensive were to succeed, Russia would be left with no choice but to use nuclear weapons. His logic was that Ukrainian success could be considered as a threat to the Russian state’s existence. This references the updated nuclear doctrine which states that Russia will use nuclear weapons if the state’s survival is threatened. Ukraine does not threaten Russia’s survival, but it does threaten the Putin regime’s survival. The most interesting take away from Medvedev’s threat is how he raised the possibility of Ukrainian success. The Kremlin is so fearful of this that they are trying to stop it with the threat of using nuclear weapons. Medvedev’s rhetoric exposed the insecurity that has spread throughout the highest levels of leadership. Rather than professing future success, the Kremlin fears defeat. All Medvedev can do is try to stoke fear. That will not stop Ukraine’s drones, nor its military. The Ukrainian attacks inside Russia are going to continue. The Kremlin realizes there is little they can do about it.

Click here for: Two Times The Terror – The Moscow Drone Strikes (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #337)

Back In Business – Prigozhin: The Sequel (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #334b)

I was never a fan of sequels. Then again, who is? It is axiomatic that the second film in a series is almost always worse than a famous first effort. They often leave viewers puzzled as to why another film was made. Sequels are derivative and redundant. The plot is no longer original. Characters morph into something they were not originally meant to be. The story arcs are prone to odd contortions while trying to maintain continuity with the original. These make little sense and are either ridiculous or predictable. And yet, audiences still pack theaters to watch sequels. Very rarely do they equal the crowds that show up for the first film, but enough go to make sequels a highly profitable enterprise. If the original film was good enough, people will come back to experience a semblance of the same thing once again. Nevertheless, it is universally acknowledged that sequels pale in comparison to the original film.

Seat at the table – Yevgeny Prigozhin and Vladimir Putin

Acting Out – The Plot Thickens
There is a sequel now playing at the highest levels of Russian politics. Last week it had a world premiere at the hotel in St. Petersburg. Appearing on the not so red carpet was Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose last starring role was an unforgettable performance as the leader of a band of malevolent mutineers in the form of his Wagner Group ensemble. Mutiny on the Don captured the world’s attention on June 23^rd and 24^th as Prigozhin and an unlikely band of war criminals came closer than anyone to threatening Vladimir Putin’s grip on power. Audiences across the world were astonished by Prigozhin and his less than merry band of mercenaries as they acted out an ad hoc scheme to march into Moscow. Once there, they planned to give the highest echelons of the Russian military a first-class ass kicking.

This was incredible theater that kept audiences gripped to Telegram channels and Twitter accounts, the social media services that endlessly stream war. Everyone was glued to their iPhones and Androids as they watched Mutiny on the Don until it turned out to be a Russian ruse. They had just spent 36 hours watching what they thought was a rebellion before the storyline took a turn towards the sublime when the whole thing was suddenly called off. This was a deeply unsatisfying conclusion. Audiences were left disappointed. This left the chance of a sequel slim to none. Prigozhin’s career as a mutineer was done. His future would most likely be arrest, imprisonment and something the Kremlin could call an accident. He was thought to be as good as dead. It was assumed that his Wagner mercenary forces would be relegated to a backlot, where they would become cannon fodder on demand.

No one came out of this performance looking good. The Kremlin was exposed as a sideshow. The performance of its long-time lead, Vladimir Putin, was universally panned by critics. He would continue in his role as Russian President, but his days of the world’s fate were over. His career had been waning for some time. Audiences had once seen Putin as the epitome of power. He was now exposed as a feeble and floundering autocrat well past his prime. Nothing to see here.  The slow, inexorable decline of Putin would be best if it happened off-screen. That was where he had been for most of the mutiny anyway. The one time he appeared, Putin came across as a hectoring incompetent.

Survival instinct – Yevgeny Prigozhin

Perilous Plans – Own Worst Enemies
As for Prigozhin, he had ultimately proven to be just as much of a disappointment. Villains should go down in a blaze of glory, sticking with their sinister ways until they flame out. Prigozhin turned out to be a less than masterful manipulator. He could not ultimately follow through with his plan. He decided to save himself rather than pursue power at any cost. Prigozhin had promised so much and delivered so little. A sequel with him starring was the furthest thing from anyone’s mind. Viewers do not want to see characters acting like their own worst enemies. Prigozhin had previously been seen as wily, malevolent, and sadistic. Now he looked like a hapless coward, self-obsessed and foolishly ambitious. Not the stuff stars are made of. It was time to put Prigozhin out to pasture. Then the comeback began. Putin and Prigozhin took it upon themselves to start a new storyline. This one would be almost as improbable as Mutiny on the Don. Rather than being run off the set, Putin is allowing Prigozhin to return to the spotlight.

Prigozhin’s reentrance to the dregs of Russian society came via the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg. The event was less sensational than it sounds, especially compared to last year. Fewer African leaders and officials were in attendance. Putin has managed to upset many of them by reneging on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Stopping Ukrainian grain exports to Africa is a receipt for famine. This threatens long suffering states both north and south of the Sahara with widespread hunger and unrest. African officials that stayed away from the summit did not want to be seen in league with Russia. The upshot was yet another underwhelming performance on the international stage for Putin, whose career continues in perpetual decline.

Taken by surprise – Vladimir Putin

Customer Service – Taking Care of Business
The one aspect of the summit which caused a sensation was the reappearance of Prigozhin. One of the photos shared (obviously intentional) showed the mutineer-in-chief gripping the hand of the Central African Republic’s Protocol Officer. Prigozhin looked well rested and ready to do business. In blue jeans and a polo shirt, Prigozhin’s casual dress belied someone who seemed to be enjoying himself. And why not? He had not only managed to survive his failed mutiny, but Prigozhin was back dealing with one of his best customers. The Central African Republic’s government has availed itself of Wagner Group’s services to the detriment of its citizens. Prigozhin is back to pursuing his business interests. A sequel looks to already be in the works. While it is doubtful that Prigozhin’s return will live up to expectations, the story continues whether anyone wants it too or not. What happens next is anyone’s guess? This sequel might not be good, but it will certainly be intriguing.

Click here for: Hitting Them Where It Hurts – Ukrainian Attacks on Chonhar Bridge & Moscow (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #335)

Let’s Make A Deal – Prigozhin’s Return & Putin’s Folly (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #334a)

Two things came to mind when I saw a photo of Yevgeny Prigozhin shaking hands with an official of the Central African Republic at a hotel in St. Petersburg, Russia. The first was that mutiny has never looked so pleasant. The other was how the mighty have fallen. The pleasant demeanor is in reference to Prigozhin 2.0. The post-mutineer man about town, still wheeling and dealing in sinister fashion. The second reference is to the decline, but not yet the fall of the man Prigozhin’s mutiny irreparably weakened, Vladimir Putin.

Back in business – Yevgeny Prigozhin with an official of the Central African Republic in St Petersburg

Lost Highway – Russian Road Trip
Only five weeks ago, Prigozhin was enjoying raucous support in Rostov-On-Don. He and his fellow mutineers followed this up with a march on Moscow. They were on the ultimate Russian road trip. Their destination was wherever they could find Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Valery Gerasimov. Along the way they shot down some helicopters and planes of the Russian military while enjoying an avenue of advance that looked like it would lead all the way to Moscow. The mercenaries, who had previously been seen as nothing more than the essence of Russian malevolence in Ukraine, were on the verge of becoming conquering heroes of their own country. Ready and willing to make command changes in the Russian military at the point of a gun barrel or go down in flames.

Meanwhile, the whereabouts of Vladimir Putin were an open question. Finally, he made an angry speech, promising to put an end to the mutiny. Everyone knows what happened next. Prigozhin was talked out of his revolt by Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko with promises of being given a safe haven in Belarus. This turnabout in fortunes was just as astonishing as the march on Moscow. No one could quite believe what happened. Making sense of it was an exercise in speculation about shadowy machinations in the Kremlin. The result of this seriously ridiculous string of events was that neither Prigozhin nor Putin was a winner. The mutiny was either a serious threat to Putin’s rule or a shameless charade by a rogue elite desperately trying to maintain his wealth and power. It turned out to be a combination of both.

Dubious intentions – Vladimir Putin at Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg

Marked Man – Putting Prigozhin In His Place
In the days and weeks which followed the mutiny, speculation was rife as to the whereabouts of Prigozhin. There were reports that he was lurking around St. Petersburg, seen in Moscow, and hanging out at a hotel near Minsk. Kremlinologists felt that Prigozhin had done himself in with the mutiny. They opined that this was something Putin would never tolerate. It was bad enough that a princeling undermined Putin’s rule in the middle of a war gone horribly wrong. Making it that much worse was the mutiny occurring just a couple of weeks after Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive began. The last thing that Putin needed was yet another problem. Surely, he would put Prigozhin in his place which would be in a coffin six feet underground.

Putin had shown signs of barely controlled anger in the televised appearances he made during and just after the mutiny. Though he did not specifically name Prigozhin during these appearances, it was obvious who Putin was referring to when he used the word “treason.” This was tantamount to a death sentence being rendered on Prigozhin before the Russian public. In the past, Putin has acted as prosecutor, judge, and jury on anyone who threatened to undermine his rule. It was assumed he would do the same thing to Prigozhin. The wayward henchman would either be murdered by the security services or put in prison for the rest of what would most likely be a very short existence.

Prigozhin was thought to be a man living on borrowed time. If there is one thing Putin has valued above all else during his long and murderous career, it has been loyalty. Prigozhin and Wagner mercenaries had committed an unforgivable sin. They were now being labeled as enemies of the Russian state. Putin was getting ready to dole out his own merciless brand of justice. Dire consequences were sure to follow, or so everyone thought. It was not to be.

Belarus bound – Wagner mercenaries

Wheeling & Dealing – Less Than All Powerful
In another unpredictable turn of events, the Kremlin’s chief spokesman and Putin mouthpiece, Dimitry Peskov, stated that Putin had met with Wagner Group commanders, including Prigozhin, in the Kremlin. Rather than having them arrested or murdered, Putin played a Kremlin version of Let’s Make A Deal. This extremely dangerous game has been played many times before over the last 23 years with Putin always the winner. In this case, he offered Wagner commanders and their forces a couple of options. One was an opportunity to join the Russian military and fight for the same organization they held in utter contempt. Or they could go to Belarus and do whatever Lukashenko had in mind for them. Prigozhin would no longer lead them into battle in Ukraine. Furthermore, they would no longer fight in Ukraine. They chose the Belarusian option. With this, Prigozhin’s power was seemingly checked, but if so, why was Putin allowing him into the gilded halls of the Kremlin? And why was Prigozhin being seen in St. Petersburg and Moscow? He was still a free man.

In this case, the all-powerful and autocrat Putin turned out to be nothing of the sort. He was still in charge, but Putin compromised his own position. Why he did this is not clear. Putin must have believed that he had to make a deal. No one had come to his aid during the mutiny. Killing Prigozhin might lead to another uprising. This was a chance that Putin could not afford to take. For someone who prides himself on projecting power and has spent the 21st century cultivating a tough guy image, this was humiliating. This was the latest in a long list of embarrassments that Putin has suffered since the full-scale of Ukraine began.

Prigozhin and Wagner were given an exit strategy and they took it. Prigozhin was thought to be done in Russia. In a televised address, Putin let all of Russia in a not so well-kept secret, specifically that the Russian government had supplied Wagner Group with massive financial support. He did not have to say Prigozhin’s name for everyone to know what he meant. The chief mutineer had robbed the state’s coffers and then turned on his donor. State television also got in on the anti-Prigozhin propaganda, taking their own shots. Prigozhin was on his way to becoming persona non grata. This was the way Putin dealt with Prigozhin and the mutiny. Truth be told, he was not dealing with it at all. The one positive was that Prigozhin would be out of Russia. At least that was what everyone thought. No one thought there would be a sequel to the sublime show the world had just witnessed. They were wrong.

Click here for: Back In Business – Prigozhin: The Sequel (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #334b)