Differing Perspectives – Bakhmut vs. Southern Front (Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine #356d)

On his recent trip to the United States, Volodymyr Zelensky worked to boost support for Ukraine’s war against Russia. The visit was vital to keep critical supplies of weapons flowing to Ukrainian forces. It could not have come soon enough. Support from conservatives in the House of Representatives has been ebbing for quite some time. Ukraine’s difficulty in breaking through Russian defensive lines in the current counteroffensive has given the American hard right ammunition to sow greater opposition to the war. This is of great concern to anyone who realizes just how important it is for Ukraine to win the war. Fortunately, the majority of America’s political and military leadership are in favor of continued support for Ukraine. That support has generally come with very few strings attached, but the Pentagon does have some misgivings over Ukraine’s current military strategy.

Sign of progress – Ukrainian tank near Bakhmut

Symbolism & Vindication – The Push For Bakhmut
One thing that some may have missed during Zelensky’s trip to Washington was his announcement that by the end of this year Ukrainian forces would recapture Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine. Such a victory would hold special symbolism for the Ukrainian president. He is rumored to have become fixated with Bakhmut as the fight for it became ever more ferocious until Russian forces finally captured and occupied it in the late spring. Now Bakhmut has once again become a focal point for Zelensky. Ukrainian forces are working their way back towards recapturing it. By doing so, they would be reversing Russia’s lone victory of the war since July 2022. It would strike a major blow to Russian morale, but Bakhmut is of limited strategic value.

The Russians found this out after capturing it. What did they gain by capturing Bakhmut? That question is difficult to answer. Perhaps a minor and short-lived boost to morale. The victory was symbolic, but that did nothing to turn the war in Russia’s favor. If anything, it further entrenched stalemate. Their victory at Bakhmut was not nearly as important as the thousands of troops they lost in the process. Those losses have severely limited Russia’s potential to go back on the offensive. Bakhmut’s effect on military operations is not just limited to Russia. The same thing on a lesser scale could be happening to Ukraine. Some think it may already have.

Earlier this year some in the Pentagon questioned whether Ukraine should be expending so many men and material to keep Russia from capturing Bakhmut as long as possible. The Ukrainian leadership’s response was that the defense of Bakhmut degraded Russia’s reservoir of soldiers and supplies. That was true, but Ukraine lost a large number of experienced soldiers in the process. Those soldiers would have been extremely valuable in Ukraine’s current counteroffensive. Whether fighting to retake Bakhmut is the best use of Ukraine’s resources is a question worth pondering. The Pentagon certainly has been thinking about this.

Coming to America – Volodymyr Zelensky & his wife Olena arrive in Washington

Problematic Paradoxes – Two Too Many Choices
The Pentagon is said to prefer that Ukraine focus solely on the southern front in Zaporizhzhia province. For quite some time there has been consternation among American military strategists in the Pentagon over Ukraine pouring resources into the battle for Bakhmut. They believe that Ukraine already made a mistake by fighting so hard to defend Bakhmut in the spring. As the current counteroffensive has proved less successful than expected, this has added weight to that argument. Exacerbating the disagreement is the current Ukrainian effort to retake Bakhmut which consists of little more than ruins. There are also pressing matters in another part of the Eastern Front. The Russians have been conducting limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk area with some limited success. The Ukrainian troops trying to retake Bakhmut could be utilized to ensure any Russian advance in that area is stopped and hold the line elsewhere. This would allow a greater effort in the south where any breach of Russian lines could gain momentum.

The Ukrainian leadership’s thinking is that taking Bakhmut would send a clear message that Russia cannot sustain any success. This would damage the morale of Russian forces. Low morale has been an issue for the Russians since the full-scale invasion began. Amid another grim, gray, and cold winter, the loss of Bakhmut would only exacerbate existing issues. This makes sense from the Ukrainian perspective, but there is one big problem. Since it is difficult to quantify morale, there is no telling whether retaking Bakhmut would have the desired effect. The only clear way of measuring morale is in desertions or the collapse of Russian lines. Despite being poorly led and supplied while incurring hundreds of thousands of casualties, Russian forces have dug in and continued to fight. How much longer is anyone’s guess? The Russians often seem to fight better when on the edge of disaster. Whereas they perform poorly when the odds are in their favor. This paradox makes it difficult to predict the current campaign’s outcome.

Line of control – Current areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces
(Credit: British Defense Intelligence)

Emotion Versus Reason – Strategic Sensibilities
Bakhmut is a powerful symbol, one that has risen to near mythic proportions well beyond recapturing it will do little to advance the ultimate Ukrainian goal of expelling all Russian troops from their territory. The Pentagon’s perspective seems more strategically sensible. Nevertheless, Ukrainian leadership has scored many military successes throughout the war based on sound strategy and tactics. They have also made several mistakes, as any leadership will do when forced to learn as they go.  Emotion and symbolism play a role in decisions, more so for the combatants than their supporters. 

Ukrainian leadership must weigh the resources available versus the challenges they face along an 850-kilometer-long active front. A breakthrough on the southern front and a Ukrainian drive to either the Sea of Azov or Black Sea coastline would send shockwaves through Russia’s political and military leadership. It would put Russia’s most critical supply lines in Crimea within range of Ukrainian artillery fire. This would isolate the peninsula as well as many Russian forces stranded west of where the breakthrough might occur in southern Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky might like the idea of Ukrainian forces retaking Bakhmut, but a breakthrough in the south would go a long way towards winning the war and ensuring that Russian troops are expelled from Ukraine.

Coming soon: The Most Difficult Decisions – Win, Lose or Draw in Ukraine (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #356c)

A Most Difficult Decision – Win, Lose or Draw in Ukraine (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #356c)

No one can deny that the stakes in the Ukraine-Russia war are extremely high. The current Ukrainian counteroffensive has raised them to a fever pitch as pressure builds on both the combatants and their supporters. This is a situation that very few foresaw arising and one that continues to defy predictions. If anyone a decade ago would have claimed that Eastern and Southern Ukraine would be the epicenters of a battle between western and eastern visions of the world no one would have believed them. What might have seemed at the time to be a regional problem has become a much larger issue where Europe and NATO have a great deal at stake.

On the move – American Abrams tanks heading to the frontlines in Ukraine

Decisions In The East – Drivers of Destiny
The United States is at the epicenter of support for Ukraine and as such, has the highest degree of influence on Ukraine. This influence has led to disagreements over war strategy. The current one between Ukraine and the Pentagon on where best to allocate Ukraine’s limited resources could be viewed as the usual rancor among allies, but the stakes are so high that the differing opinions cannot be discounted. The decisions that are being made now could heavily influence the war’s outcome and decide the path to victory, stalemate, or defeat for Ukraine.

So much has happened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was launched by Russia on February 24, 2022, that it is important to understand how the current situation arose. A situation where a couple of places remote from the centers of geopolitical power have taken on an outsized importance that no one would have believed possible a couple of years ago. These areas are in and around the ruined city of Bakhmut and the Zaporizhzhia region of southern Ukraine.

Few could have found either of these areas on a map prior to the Ukraine-Russia war and even today, many continue to be unaware of their importance or the history from which they arose. Nothing less than the future of Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the international rules-based order are at stake. Getting to the current situation where Bakhmut and the Zaporizhzhia region became of the utmost importance took decades rather than years, months, or days. A short refresher course can provide some much-needed context.

Ties That Bind – Not Without A Fight
Since the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union collapsed over three decades ago, Europe had enjoyed a period of peace (the Yugoslav Wars were a notable exception) and increasing prosperity. This was particularly true for Eastern Europe. A region that had suffered catastrophic conflicts and the worst excesses of ideologically inspired totalitarian regimes during the 20th century, was finally able to escape its tumultuous past. Eastern Europe enjoyed greater integration with the rest of Europe, the byproduct was political freedom and economic dynamism. The future of the region had not seemed this bright since before the First World War.

To be sure, there were outliers that did not share in Eastern Europe’s post-Cold War peace dividend or promise of prosperity. These included parts of the western Balkans, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The last four had been constituent parts of the Soviet Union during most of the 20th century. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, Russia returned to its historical role as the imperialist heavyweight. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia was not going to let these newly independent nations go without a fight.

The Kremlin offered a combination of inducements and punishments to control those nations which constituted their European near abroad and which were neither European Union nor NATO members. Russia often resorted to subversive measures to exercise control. These included ensuring the Kremlin puppet won elections and disinformation campaigns aimed at any political entity professing western values. Most of these measures were covert, but those nations which most fiercely resisted (Georgia and Ukraine) were subjected to the most extreme overt measure, a shooting war.

In Ukraine’s case, it was the people’s resistance to Russian pressure which the Kremlin found intolerable. The upshot was the Kremlin’s facilitation of a war with Ukraine beginning in 2014 and which exploded into full-scale warfare a year and a half ago. That war has defied expectations. The consensus was that Ukraine did not stand a chance. Ukrainians proved the doubters wrong by accomplishing minor miracles on the battlefield. This then raised expectations that Ukraine could win the war outright. Those expectations have led to questions about whether Ukraine is pursuing the right strategy and tactics.

The war is now at a critical juncture, one which could decide whether Ukraine will be able to achieve its ultimate goal of taking back all the territory illegally occupied by Russia. Specifically, in campaigns for Bakhmut and on the southern front in Zaporizhzhia Province. What does or does not happen in those two places will go a long way in deciding the fate of Ukraine, the future of Europe and American foreign policy there.

Hard targets – Ruins in Bakhmut

Second Guesses – Murmurs of Discontent
Concerns over Ukraine’s military strategy by the Pentagon began to appear in the media earlier this year. Other allies have also expressed their misgivings at times, but American support is the most crucial for Ukraine to have a fighting chance of winning the war. The disagreements have centered around Ukraine’s counteroffensive which has not been as successful as many predicted. Prior to the counteroffensive, Ukraine’s allies believed that with western training, tactics and weapons, Ukrainian forces would be able to break through Russian lines and achieve the same kind of sweeping victory they did in Kharkiv province last autumn. That has not come close to happening.

The counteroffensive ran up against heavy resistance. Ukrainian forces took lots of casualties in the initial phase of the offensive. This led the Ukrainians to abandon the western tactic of combined arms warfare because it was proving too costly, especially since they did not have the needed weaponry and were using inexperienced forces. The change in tactics to smaller numbers of troops inching their way forward has proven more successful, but at a slow rate. Patience in the west has begun to wane with criticism and angst becoming louder.

Ukraine’s military leadership understands their forces better than outside observers, but that does not mean they always make the right decisions. While the counteroffensive slogs forward in Zaporizhzhia Province, hundreds of kilometers to the northeast, Ukrainian forces have been fighting to take back Bakhmut. The city is of limited strategic value, particularly in comparison to the southern front. This has led to enduring questions about Ukraine’s strategy. One of the greatest advocates of the strategy to retake Bakhmut is said to be Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky. 

Click here for: Differing Perspectives – Bakhmut vs. Southern Front (Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine #356d)

The Bakhmut Effect – A Zero Sum Battle (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #356a)

The Battle of Bakhmut is not over. Nor will it be for many more months. Russia’s lone victory over the past 14 months has done little good and irreparable damage to their prospects of success in Ukraine.  Their victory at Bakhmut is likely to turn into defeat and end in their retreat from Bakhmut by the end of this year. The battle has cost both Russia and Ukraine thousands of soldiers. It will continue to exact a dreadful toll for all involved. Western military analysts believe that Bakhmut is a losing cause for both sides. That goes for Ukraine as well as Russia.

The Verdun Syndrome – A Losing Cause 
There have been comparisons made between Bakhmut and Stalingrad. The latter was a battle of attrition like Bakhmut, but with a major difference. Stalingrad ended with a decisive result that changed the entire course of World War 2 in Europe. The Battle of Bakhmut still has not ended. Russia’s victory decided nothing other than exhausting their offensive potential into the foreseeable future. Since Bakhmut, the Russians have been extremely limited in offensive operations. There are still three months left in 2023, but Russian military operations in Ukraine this year can be summed up as an offensive for Bakhmut followed by a defensive posture. 

Despite Russian forces occupying and declaring victory in Bakhmut the ultimate result is still undecided. The consequences of that result will play out over a longer span of time. In that sense, Bakhmut has some similarities with the Battle of Verdun during World War One. Verdun was a much bigger battle, but the result did irreparable damage to both combatants. The French and Germans ended up losing much more than they gained. The Germans bled the French Army of manpower, but not enough to alter the course of the war. The French held on at Verdun and defeated the Germans, but in the process suffered horrific losses. Neither side was the same after the battle. The Germans could not afford to fight battles where they expended the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers without any lasting success. As for the French, their loss of manpower meant they had virtually no chance of pushing the Germans out of their country without major assistance from their allies. That would take two more years of punishing battles.

No man’s land – Bakhmut in November 2022 

Stuck In Neutral – The Bakhmut Effect
Bakhmut is nowhere near the scale of Verdun, nor will it ever be. That does not make the comparisons any less appropriate. The results of Bakhmut are much the same, albeit on a much smaller scale. The Russians wanted to erode Ukraine’s manpower. The Ukrainians wanted to do the same to the Russians. In this regard, both were successful to the point that neither side was able to make any type of breakthrough in the months following the battle. Russian forces did not even try, while Ukraine’s current counteroffensive has been less successful than anticipated. This might be called the Bakhmut effect.

At some point in the distant future historians will decide how to define the Battle of Bakhmut. It may well go down in history as an entire campaign that lasted for more than a year. Alternatively, the battle may be broken up into the First Battle of Bakhmut (Russian pyrrhic victory) and 2nd Battle of Bakhmut (to be determined). Why does this matter? Because Bakhmut is a cauldron of violence with an unknown end. The longer it goes on, the greater effect it will have on the resources of both sides. Bakhmut is a battle of attrition within a larger war of attrition. Whoever takes Bakhmut has done so with a victory that is indistinguishable from defeat. Right now, that is the Russians. In the not-too-distant future that might be Ukrainians.

The significance of Bakhmut continues to be what it always has been, a symbolic rather than a strategic victory. For the Russians, Bakhmut demonstrated they could still win a battle, even if it was mainly the work of Wagner Group. That victory came at an incalculable cost. Russia lost an alarming number of soldiers fighting for what amounted to a completely burnt out, depopulated hellscape of a city that existed in name only by the time they were able to finally occupy it. Thousands of prisoners recruited by Wagner Group were used as cannon fodder.  

Battle among the ruins – Bakhmut in March 2023 (Credit: Dpsu.gov.ua)

Replacement Strategy – An Unhappy Ending
Bakhmut was the end for Wagner Group forces fighting in Ukraine. Their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin won his final victory there. Such was his disgruntlement over the losses and lack of Russian military support that it led to his ill-fated mutiny. Those that managed to survive the battle were replaced by regular Russian soldiers who got to enjoy a victory won by all the blood spilled by Wagner forces. 

When Russian soldiers took over in Bakhmut, their job was to occupy and hold the non-existent city. It did not take long for Ukrainian counterattacks to begin. The Russian grip on Bakhmut has been getting weaker. Ukrainians forces have made hard fought gains. Like everything in this war over the past 14 months it has been very slow going. Russian forces might be suffering from low morale and poor leadership, but the defense has been at a decided advantage throughout the war.

Bakhmut provides a unique problem for the Russian military. Because of the Kremlin propagandizing the victory, losing Bakhmut would undermine an already rickety official narrative. How do Russian forces win such a hard-fought battle and not do everything they can to hold Bakhmut. There would be no explaining away the loss of it. Defeat at Bakhmut would raise questions back home about why Russian forces could not hold what Wagner Group mercenaries won. What would this say about the Russian military’s high command? The same questions would be asked about the Kremlin’s leadership of the war effort. Thus, the Russians have no choice but to hold Bakhmut no matter the cost. Political realities override strategic sensibilities.

Preoccupations – Sources of Controversy 
Bakhmut has caused Russia more issues than it is worth. They created the problem and now are stuck with it. The Russian military does not occupy Bakhmut, as much as it occupies them. Paradoxically, there is the potential for Bakhmut to cause Ukraine major problems as well. In some ways it already has. The effort by Ukrainian forces to hold Bakhmut was controversial. They lost invaluable manpower in the process. Now they are fighting to get it back. This has led to another controversy that threatens friction between Ukraine and its most stalwart ally.

Click here for: Resource Scarcity – Bakhmut vs. The Southern Front (Russian Invasion of Ukraine #356b)

Diminishing Returns – Bakhmut: A Fight With No Finish (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #320)

The deadliest battle in the deadliest war in human history was fought at Stalingrad. It became the decisive turning point on the Eastern Front during World War II. According to some historians it was the turning point for the entire war. Following Stalingrad, the German tide rolled back. The Wehrmacht’s advance deep into Soviet territory was over. For the Germans, Stalingrad was the seminal disaster that made their eventual defeat all but inevitable. The surge of Soviet forces that ended with the conquest of Berlin and destruction of Nazi Germany in 1945 began in earnest at Stalingrad. The battle was a world historical event that time has done nothing to diminish its importance. It would be difficulty to understate Stalingrad’s effect on the German Army’s fighting capacity and future conduct of the war.

Before Stalingrad, the Germans still had a chance of winning the war, after Stalingrad they had no chance at all. The battle changed everything on the Eastern Front. Some contemporary analysts and commentators have gone so far as to suggest the same thing might be happening with the ongoing Battle of Bakhmut in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Their comparisons of Bakhmut with Stalingrad are missing the mark. Bakhmut is much smaller in scale and shows no sign of rendering a decisive result. Rather than Stalingrad, a better comparison is between Bakhmut and many battles on the Western Front during World War I. Many of these remain anonymous to all but hardcore military history buffs.

Fight without a finish – Ukrainian artillery at Bakhmut

Battle Worn – Inconclusive At Best, Self-Defeating At Worst
The Battle of Bakhmut has been waged with increasing ferocity over the last several months. What was once a stalemate has turned into an incremental movement forward by Russian forces. They have lost tens of thousands of soldiers fighting their way into the city center. The Ukrainians have also sustained large numbers of casualties. Artillery duels, human wave assaults, and fierce defensive resistance have been the hallmarks of Bakhmut. This is the same type of fighting that occurred along the Western Front of World War I. Battles lasted for weeks or months. One battle was indistinguishable from another. They were so inconclusive that many were grouped under the term “offensive”, as if running to stand still constitutes forward movement. Bakhmut is certainly no Stalingrad where encirclement by the Soviets destroyed the German 2^nd Army.

No one has any idea of Bakhmut’s ultimate legacy or even if there will be one. A Russian victory has been predicted for well over a month, but still has not been forthcoming. If or when the Russians do take Bakhmut, no one will call the victory decisive in any sense of that word. Rather than Stalingrad, Bakhmut is more akin to those battles which proved inconclusive at best, self-defeating at worse. Battles with names like First Ypres, Second Ypres, and Third Ypres. Only military historians, fanatics or tour guides can delineate the difference between each one. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that such battles did little to decide the war. Their overall effect was delayed. The true value of such battles only became apparent in 1918, when the accumulation of casualties and war weariness caused the German Army to collapse.

How much damage did those long and violent slogs do to the Kaiser’s Army? A massive amount. Unfortunately, the Allies were almost as exhausted from those battles as well. While we now refer to those battles as attritional, both sides hoped to affect a breakthrough or gain weaken the other side to such an extent, that the next offensive would lead to victory. Four years later this happened, but outside influences played a large part. The United States entry into the war provided an inestimable boost to allied men, material, and morale. This, along with the blockade of Germany, was the tipping point that finally put the balance of war in favor of the Allies. If not, the two sides might have kept on manning the trenches for several more years. For far too long there was no end in sight. This is where the Battle of Bakhmut now stands.

Explosions in the sky – Second Battle of Ypres

Symbolic Value – Exhausting Possibilities
Both Ukraine and Russia have a great deal to lose in the Battle of Bakhmut and little to gain. If this sounds a lot like a repeat of war on the Western Front, that is no coincidence. Neither side wants to admit defeat. Nor will they, no matter the outcome. The definition of defeat varies between the two sides. The Russians are the favorites to emerge victorious in the battle. Reports from western intelligence sources state that Russian forces now hold half the city. This has created the expectation that Bakhmut will soon fall to them. Ironically, this puts more pressure on them than it does the Ukrainians. The Russians must capture Bakhmut. They have lost an alarming number of soldiers in the battle.

No matter whether these soldiers were prisoners turned cannon fodder or raw recruits thrown into a meat grinder, the price paid in casualties has been so high that for Russia not to capture the entirety of Bakhmut would be tantamount to defeat. The battle is a losing situation for the Russians even if they “win.” Failure to capture Bakhmut is unthinkable, but a victory does little to change the overall strategic situation. The Russians are in a trap of their own making. The best outcome of the battle for them has less to do with capturing Bakhmut and more to do with how much damage they can inflict on Ukrainian forces. That Bakhmut has become a battle of attrition is in the Russian’s favor. That is if they do not exhaust their own forces in the process.

As for Ukrainian forces, Bakhmut has as much symbolic as it does strategic value. Holding out for as long as possible is a way of showing the Ukrainian people that their military forces will not give up so much as an inch without a fight. They are making it as difficult as possible for the Russians to capture the city. This provides a boost to morale on the home front. The message is clear, Russian aggression will be resisted no matter the cost. While that is inspiring, it is also risky. The Ukrainians are losing some of their best soldiers in the fighting. They are also expending massive amounts of artillery that could hamper their efforts in a coming offensive. Ukrainian forces must be careful not to get so caught up in holding Bakhmut that they lose sight of their overall strategic objective, which is to expel Russian forces from their territory.

No end in sight – Ukrainian soldier at Bakhmut

Fading Memory – Unsatisfying Factors
Bakhmut symbolizes just how far the war has come. The war’s early months and dreams of victory are a fading memory. While its future looks limitless. How, when and where it ends no one can tell. At this point almost anything is possible, but one thing is probable. There will be no great victory, nor resounding defeat. In that regard, Bakhmut will be like many of the battles on the Western Front, deadly rather than decisive and ultimately unsatisfying for either side.

Click here for: Explosive Situation – A Conventional World War III (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #321)

Exaggerated Comparisons – Bakhmut & Stalingrad (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #319)

We live in an age of hyperbole where every news item is exaggerated for effect. Sensationalism is all the rage in both traditional and social media. Sneezes are likened to hurricanes and a sense of proportion hardly exists. Headlines are source material for outrage, scandal, and tragedy. Combine all three and it is almost guaranteed that the content will go viral. This can make for some strange statements and historical comparisons that lack proper context. Whatever happens is supersized with sensationalism and blown completely beyond all proportion. Storms are catastrophic, disasters apocalyptic and the end of the world is nigh. Heart attack inducing headlines are now the norm. The tabloidization of the news has left less room for informed analysis. Sound bites have become a substitute for thoughtful commentary. The 24 hour news cycle must deal with attention deficit disordered population they have done a large part to create. Grabbing the viewer’s or reader’s attention is paramount, holding it is an entirely different story, one the media has neither the time nor the inclination to tell. Nowhere is this truer than in the Ukraine-Russia War.

Into battle – Ukrainian tank at Bakhmut

Staying Focused – The Attention Deficit War
After a year of one horrific report after another from Ukraine, it has become more difficult for the media to hold the attention of news consumers. War fatigue has shortened attention spans. This means that exaggerations are only going to become more commonplace as both legacy and new media try to find ways to capture the attention of audiences. One of the more historically egregious statements has been to compare the Battle of Bakhmut to the Battle of Stalingrad. This comparison is a stretch by any reasonable standard. Bakhmut is an ongoing struggle between a smaller army performing beyond all expectations and a larger army that continues to underachieve. Bakhmut has become a cauldron of killing, but this is in the context of a world that has not seen a major conventional conflict of the size nor the scale of the Ukraine-Russia war in the 21^st century.

While the casualty figures are astronomical by the standards of post-1945 wars in Europe (which have been almost nonexistent), by the standards of battles fought on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, Bakhmut would barely rate a mention.  The problem for contemporary journalists and analysts looking to make a comparison between Bakhmut and historical antecedent is that that they literally nothing to go on since 1945. The shock of seeing such extraordinary violence has been magnified by how little experience of warfare Europe has over the past seventy-tears. Anyone looking for more recent historical antecedents will search in vain.  Thus, the use of Stalingrad as a point of comparison. That is taking historical comparisons to extremes.

Holding the line – Ukraine soldiers at Bakhmut

False Equivalents – A Sense of Scale
Bakhmut is no Stalingrad. The latter was an apocalyptic struggle where two massive armies were locked in a life-or-death battle. Stalingrad was a microcosm of World War II on the Eastern Front. The Germans and Soviets were bitter foes with ideological and racial elements to their conflict that made it particularly prone to violence. The Nazis viewed Slavs as an inferior race and targeted them for eventual extermination. This meant that surrender for Soviet soldiers was a virtual death sentence. While the Kremlin has targeted Ukrainians, it is more in the interests of subjugation rather than extermination. The genocidal aspects of Russian attacks on Ukrainians are a byproduct of the imperialist instinct to subjugate Ukraine under Russian rule. Conversely, the Nazis bloodlust for extermination of the Soviet population was a core objective of their war effort. This is an important difference, but it in no way excuses the violence Russian forces have inflicted upon Ukrainians at the Kremlin’s direction.

The fact is that Putin would be more than happy to turn Ukrainians into Russians. The Nazis would never tolerate turning Slavs into Germans (except for a small minority they identified with Aryan characteristics). No wonder Soviet soldiers were willing to fight so hard for their homeland. They were literally fighting to live. If they lost, all hope for the future was gone. Ironically, contemporary Ukrainians do share a similarity with the Soviet people. They have targets on their backs as well. These targets are based on their representation of Ukrainian nationhood which Putin wants to end. Any Ukrainian who resists Russian control is considered an enemy. Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom and sovereignty.  On many occasions this has meant they are fighting for their lives, but it is still not the same as being targeted purely for one’s ethnicity. Soviet soldiers at Stalingrad knew that if they lost the war, their situation would be hopeless. They had an either/or decision to make.

Holding out – Bakhmut in February 2023 (Credit: Mil.gov.ua)

Anything But Decisive – Splitting The Difference
The Ukrainians are fighting for their sovereignty and the ability to control their own future. What happens at Bakhmut will help decide their future, but the battle itself will probably not decide the war’s outcome. It is a small part of a larger whole. This is unlike Stalingrad where the Red Army’s victory in the battle was THE decisive turning point on the Eastern Front. It is too soon to tell if Bakhmut will have that kind of effect. Just because much of the media and some armchair warriors are calling Bakhmut a second Stalingrad in favor of the Ukrainians, does not mean it is or will be. Even if the Russians lose the battle and retreat from Bakhmut, it is doubtful that they would then abandon the war.

More likely they would find another Bakhmut to fight. The accumulation of attritional battles might wear them or the Ukrainians down. In this case, Bakhmut would be one of many battles that led to the war ending. This is a much more probable outcome than Bakhmut becoming a second Stalingrad. While stranger things have happened, a repeat performance of Stalingrad will almost certainly not be one of them. The differences between the two battles are vast. A better comparison of historical antecedents with Bakhmut can be found with battles on the Western Front during World War I. A time when attrition rather than decisive victory was the most common outcome.   

Coming soon: Diminishing Returns – Bakhmut: A Fight With No Finish (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #320)

Frozen Conflict – Russia’s Winter Offensive (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #315)

This is the coldest winter in Ukraine, but not because of the weather. The Ukraine-Russia War has turned into a rough approximation of a frozen conflict. In the usual definition of that term, a frozen conflict is one in which armed conflict has ended, but there is no political resolution. At the time, the Ukraine-Russia War is a frozen conflict that differs somewhat from the traditional definition. Ferocious fighting continues along some parts of the frontlines, most prominently in the Donbas region around the cities of Bakhmut and Vuledahr or at least what is left of them. These operations are part of the Russian’s planned winter offensive. They bolstered their ranks with 250,000 conscripts from the autumn “partial mobilization.” These soldiers, along with massive artillery barrages, were going to push forward against Ukrainian forces worn down from attritional warfare. The reality is that the Russians have only been able to inch their way forward and the winter offensive is frozen in place.

Frozen conflict – Ukrainian soldier in Bakhmut (Credit: Emanuel Esatolli)

Bogged Down – From Improbable To Impossible
The Russian failure to gain ground is illustrated by the Battle of Bakhmut. For months, the Russians have attempted to take the city which is located at a relatively unimportant junction of two roads. They have lost thousands of men and expended a massive amounts of armaments in the process. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces continue to hold out against incredible odds. While the fall of Bakhmut seems inevitable, each passing day that does not happen hinders Russian efforts to go on the offensive. The Russians have already been forced to downsize their expectations. A major push forward in the Donbas this winter now looks improbable, a breakthrough impossible. They are counting their gains in meters rather than kilometers.

By the standards of what was expected by the Russians and feared by the Ukrainians, the current fighting in Donbas is going nowhere. Neither army has the military might to impose their will upon the other. Russian forces are the ones trying now. Later in the spring it will be the turn of the Ukrainian Army. The current fighting is as violent and deadly as it has been anywhere in the war. Nevertheless, this had not changed facts on the ground. The Russians get thousands of their own soldiers killed and wounded, take a ruined village or two, then do the same thing all over again. Eventually they will take Bakhmut, but that will change nothing. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are in defensive mode which is to their advantage. The Ukrainian soldiers in the Donbas are holding their lines the best they can while taking heavy casualties.

Focal point – Battling for Bakhmut

Ready Reserve – The Waiting Game
There are more Ukrainian soldiers in reserve that could be used to defend Bakhmut, Vuledahr and other areas in the Donbas where the Russians have focused their offensive efforts. Many Ukrainian reserves are being held out of the fighting and saved for the expected spring offensive. The Ukrainian commander, Valery Zaluzhny said as much in an interview with The Economist magazine back in December. He knows that troops in the Donbas facing Russian assaults are being sacrificed to a certain extent. This is so the Ukrainians have enough forces to conduct their own offensive in the spring where they hope to breakthrough the Russian lines.

Any Ukrainian offensive will be extremely difficult to conduct since the Russians have spent months building up their defensive lines. It will require a degree of skill that only the most advanced military forces in the world have shown. The Ukrainians are highly skilled, adaptable, and clever in their tactics. Whether they can successfully carry out a combined arms offensive with armor, artillery, and infantry remains to be seen. This will be their largest offensive of the war and possibly the most decisive. In the meantime, Ukrainian forces must hold the line against wave after wave of Russian assaults.

Usually, a frozen conflict favors the side with greater resources. It is little wonder that this has been a favorite Russian strategy throughout Putin’s time in power. The Russian prosecution of a prolonged, low intensity war in the Donbas from 2014 until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a prime example. What Putin did not imagine or prefer was that his full-scale invasion of Ukraine beginning a year ago would bog down into the sort of bloody stalemate that is happening today. While Putin seems confident that he can eventually wear the Ukrainians down by keeping the war going until their support from western allies’ wanes, he runs the risk of exhausting his own forces to such an extent that they become vulnerable to a Ukrainian counterattack. Either that or they are only fit to hold their own lines.

Long winter – Civilian in Bakhmut

Net Gain – Defensive Minded
Putin has demanded that the Russian military bring capture all the Donbas. He wanted the same thing when the war began a year ago. The closest Russian forces came to achieving that goal was last spring-early summer when they managed to make slow, but progressive gains. By the time that offensive halted at the beginning of July, Russian forces were no longer fit to take the offensive. Much of their professional military forces were lost in the process. Russian offensives have not been the same since. This situation could now be repeating itself. The Russian forces are once again incapable of fighting their way forward without expending massive amounts of men and ammunition in the process. After several weeks of assaults, they have not made it far from their starting point. There is no end in sight. Thus, the conflict for them might as well be frozen. This does not suit the Russians.

Conversely, a frozen conflict is about the best-case winter scenario the Ukrainians could have hoped for in the face of a Russian offensive. They are not losing very little ground so far. Repelling a Russian offensive is a net gain for Ukrainian forces. With the right weapons and thousands of fresh troops they can go on the offensive this spring. If the Russians cannot move forward except at great cost, they must resort to waiting out the war. Lack of progress on the battlefield is particularly difficult for the Russian military which came to conquer not sit in dirty trenches waiting for a Ukrainian counterattack. This is the situation Russian forces now find themselves in. The conflict has become frozen, the next thaw will not occur until Ukrainian forces go on the offensive.      

Click here for: To Be Continued – Russia, Ukraine & Prolonging The War (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #316)

Accelerated Attrition – Russia’s 2023 Winter Offensive (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #307)

By now, Russia’s newest offensive was supposed to be pushing forward at multiple points along the front lines in the Donbas. This has been the expectation ever since the new year began. For over a month, Ukrainian leaders and western intelligence assessments have warned that the Russians were about to undertake their largest offensive of the war since the initial invasion. The leadership of Ukraine is constantly advocating for more weapons and ammunition to hold off what is assumed to be a forthcoming Russian assault. Ukraine’s allies have met multiple times – such as this week’s Munich Security Conference – where they continue to promise greater quantities of armaments. The worry is not just that the Russians will make gains, but they whatever territory they do manage to capture will be much harder for Ukraine to recover. Ukrainian forces want to continue their forward momentum from last autumn when they go back on the offensive. That will be much more difficult if they are forced to take back territory Russia gains in the next couple of months. That would only further delay their ability to expel the Russian military from Ukrainian territory.

Headed in the wrong direction- Vladimir Putin

A Losing Strategy – Russian Offensives
Just because a major offensive from the Russians has yet to materialize does not mean it has been cancelled. They need to get started as soon as possible. The Russians are just as anxious as the Ukrainians about the coming months on the battlefield. That is because they need to go on the offensive before Ukrainian forces receive the type of game changing weapons that could break through the Russian lines. The Russians are working off a strategy of the best defense is a good offense. The problem is that every offensive they have undertaken in the war has turned out badly. The initial invasion’s greatest success were the gains made in southern Ukraine, but those were nowhere near what the Russians expected. For instance, they never got anywhere near the port city of Odesa which for has major historical resonances for Russia. The spring/early summer offensive in the Donbas was one of their most successful of the war. The problem was that they nearly destroyed their army in the process.

What the Russians achieved by taking such cities as Lysychansk and Sievierodonetsk did little to further their efforts to capture the Donbas. Unless the Russians can capture the entire region, their 2022 Donbas offensive will be seen as a defeat rather than a victory. Occupying burned out, depopulated cities such as Lysychansk only makes sense if they are a steppingstone to greater advances. As the past seven months have shown, Russians gains in the Donbas have been pyrrhic victories at best, roads to ruin at worst. Now the Russians are threatening to repeat the same process at Bakhmut. This already occurred in the Battle of Soledar, where thousands of Wagner mercenary forces died in human wave assaults that eventually resulted in the Russians gaining their first battlefield success since the start of summer. The Kremlin was not too worried about the high rate of casualties in the fighting for Soledar since those soldiers were mercenaries who had been recruited from Russian prisons. The Putin regime cannot not afford those same kinds of losses with the regular Russian Army, but that is a situation they might now be facing.

Numbers game – Russian mercenaries killed in the Battle of Bakhmut

Losing Out – Mass Casualties
Not so long ago, a war of attrition was thought to be a major advantage for Russia. The thinking was that Ukraine could not compete with the human or material resources of Russia. By any statistical standard that would seem to be true. Russia has a much larger population which provides large reserves of manpower and workers for war industries that Ukraine simply cannot match. Russia inherited most Soviet stocks of weaponry (including nuclear weapons) and ammunition that they can bring to bear upon the battlefield for several years to come. These stocks might not be state of the art, but the Russian way of war has always been based upon quantity over quality. The strategy is to fire massive amounts of artillery at the Ukrainians and hope they buckle. Whether this will work is open to debate. The results so far have been less than impressive. If anything, from the Russian perspective the results have been downright depressing.

The rate of attrition for Russian forces is at an unsustainable level for a war that is only going to get longer. Vladimir Putin’s three-day war has now turned into a 360-day war and counting. It is not just that there is no end in sight to the war for Russia, it is that there is no success in sight either. One of the initial operations that may have kicked off a new offensive was an attack on the coal mining town of Vuhledar. The Russians reportedly lost 36 tanks, over a hundred infantry fighting vehicles, and a thousand soldiers in just two days. The Russians can no longer afford such an accelerated rate of attrition. Those losses were taken by supposedly elite brigades. Whether the brigades were elite is open to question. Judging by the results they are not. These brigades were either destroyed or rendered combative ineffective. The Russians cannot keep losing men and material at this rate.

Accelerated attrition – Destroyed and abandoned Russian tanks near Vuhledar

War Fatigue – Exhausting Possibilities
Hypothetically, the Kremlin could call for another mobilization. After all, this is the same country that in the First and Second World Wars lost millions of men and continued to have a numerical advantage in soldiers despite horrific losses. There is one big difference this time, those wars were fought on Russian/Soviet soil. The war in Ukraine is being waged on foreign soil. This is true no matter what Putin says about “historic” Russian lands. Fighting on foreign ground makes a huge difference in the morale of Russian soldiers. Add to that, the high rate of attrition and it is hard to see how the Kremlin can continue the war indefinitely. War fatigue is often thought to be a western trend. The same thing could be happening to Russia. If Russian forces cannot not make any gains, then exactly what is the point of their presence in Ukraine. That is a question the Kremlin may soon have to answer whether they want to or not.

Coming soon: The Isolationist – Vladimir Putin & Russian Military Strategy (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #308)

To Be Continued – The Endless Battle of Bakhmut (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #273)

There is a mind-numbing sameness to Russian military operations in the Ukraine-Russia War. The only thing that has changed over the past ten months is the cumulative number of losses the Russians have incurred while attempting to capture cities, towns, and villages whose strategic value can never outweigh their losses in men, material, and morale. If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing again and again while expecting different results, then the Kremlin and Russia’s military high command should have their headquarters in a lunatic asylum. While the military command has tried a few different tactics lately such as drone and missile attacks targeting critical infrastructure, the ground forces mostly keep trying the same assaults that yield dreadful results.

To be continued – Ukrainian artillery firing near Bakhmut

Terrifying Tactics – A Diabolical Benchmark
Sanity is no more the Russian military’s strong suit, than the sanctity of their soldier’s lives. Those who closely follow the war cannot help but notice that Russian military operations are stuck in a viciously violent cycle. That is why I find it impossible to avoid repeating what I wrote about the Battle of Bakhmut seven weeks ago. The battle is just as counterproductive today as it was then. While the war’s future is uncertain, one thing is entirely predictable. The Russians will continue to suffer massive numbers of casualties and lose incredible quantities of military equipment while inflicting substantial losses on Ukrainian forces, but nowhere near enough to justify their archaic tactics. This situation will continue until the war ends.

To conduct proper offensive operations against well defended positions in a place like Bakhmut, the Russians need at least a three to one advantage in manpower to have any chance of success. While they have been able to marshal more manpower through mobilization, it is doubtful that the newest recruits are going to make any difference. They are undersupplied, poorly trained, and suffer from low morale. This has been the story throughout the past ten months. Sometimes it gets a little bit better, but most of the time slowly worse. Winter adds another element both literally and figuratively to the problem of declining morale. No wonder Russian forces have made very little progress in capturing Bakhmut. The only thing that has gone up are their casualty numbers. This past week estimates of the number of Russian soldiers killed in the ten months of the war topped 100,000. The winter assault on Bakhmut has done its part in helping meet that diabolical benchmark.   

Holding out – Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmat

Symbolic Importance – A Stubborn Strategy
Winter warfare in the Ukraine-Russia War has so far centered on the Donbas region and Bakhmut. This is little more than a violent operation where the Russian Army tries desperately to show that they are still on the offensive, something that has not been true since July. Their repeated attacks on Bakhmut are an attempt to engineer a victory at great cost in men and material that will result in nominal gains if it is successful. After several months of fighting, Russian forces are not much closer to success then when they started. The city is not worth the losses Russia has incurred while trying to capture it. That has not stopped them from conducting innumerable assaults. Bakhmut is of dubious strategic value. Though it controls a transport artery leading to the city of Sloviansk, the cost of capturing Bakhmut will not be worth the toll it takes on Russian soldiers. That does not matter to the high command since they continue ordering assaults. Taking Bakhmut has become a stubborn point of pride.

Bakhmut’s real importance is symbolic. Capturing the ruined city would allow the Kremlin to use it as propaganda to declare a symbolic victory to the Russian people back home. Symbolic in the sense that they can still emerge victorious despite all evidence to the contrary over the last four months. Indicative of the fighting at Bakhmut was a report from the Ukrainian military’s Eastern Operational Command on December 24th that stated Russian losses that day of 90 killed and 100 wounded in 28 separate firefights as part of 225 attacks. Multiply that by many weeks’ worth of the same thing and the toll on Russian forces is telling. The point of the fighting for Bakhmut seems to be that there is no point at all. Wars are neither won nor lost based upon the total number of men killed. While that can affect the overall outcome, winning a war is highly dependent on what is gained from losses of men. Since mid-summer, nothing has been gained and much has been lost by the Russian Army in Ukraine.

Waiting for the war to end – In Bakhmut

War Weary – The Road to Oblivion
Bakhmut has been the Russian military’s usual meat grinder. Reports from the front state that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have suffered great loss of life in battling for what is left of a city that has been rendered uninhabitable by countless assaults. Besides making the rubble bounce, Russian artillery strikes and human wave attacks against Bakhmut are little more than an exercise in attrition. The Battle of Bakhmut’s nonsensical nature is yet another tragic illustration of the Russian art of war. A war that should have never been fought in the first place is marked by battles of attrition that hurt the aggressor much more than the defender. The hope is to wear Ukrainian forces down and cause their allies to grow weary of supporting their effort to win the war.

The reality is that the military operations such as the one at Bakhmut do more damage to the Russian forces than those of the enemy. They depress morale, waste ammunition and weaponry while getting lots of soldiers killed or wounded. Bakhmut will go down in the history books along the same lines as earlier battles fought for Lyman, Lysychansk, and Sievierodonetsk as pyrrhic victories at best, senseless suicidal missions at worst. Distinguishing one battle from another is impossible. In each one a brutal process has been repeated. Russian tactics are straight out of the first half of the 20th century. The results are ambiguous. There is little difference between victory and defeat. These battles are nothing more than a steppingstone on the road to oblivion. In this war, all roads the Russian Army has taken led to dead ends. In that regard, Bakhmut is no different.

Click here for: A Potential Turning Point – Melitopol: The Gateway to Crimea (The Ukraine-Russia War #274)

Expect The Unexpected – Predictions & the Ukraine-Russia War (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #252)

One thing about the Ukraine-Russia War that everyone should know by now is to expect the unexpected. Trying to predict what will happen next in the war has been a guessing game since it began nine months ago. Early predictions of Ukraine’s imminent defeat turned out to be off the mark, but failure has never stopped the so-called experts from trying to predict the future. The same logic applies to the Ukraine-Russia War. Many analysts have refined their predictive process to approximate an outcome, rather than make sweeping declarations. A good example of this occurred with the Russian withdrawal from Kherson. For weeks, there were reports that a lesser version of Stalingrad was about to occur on the banks of the Dnipro River as 30,000 Russian soldiers were slowly being surrounded in and around Kherson city. The predicted urban combat never materialized.

Predictions were recalibrated on several occasions to make an expected Ukrainian victory a fait accompli. Speculation was reserved for how much fighting would occur before this happened. Even when it became apparent that the Russians were going to withdrawal from the city to new positions east of the Dnipro, predictions continued to be circumspect until it was known for sure. This ambiguity is a welcome change in the predictive process. While less exciting and more excruciating, ambiguity allows for less wild speculations. Predictions have become more guarded and thus more accurate. This is a byproduct of experience. The longer the war has lasted, the more reasonable predictions have become. Expectations have been tempered as reality takes hold.  Now is as good a time as any to look back at some of the predictions that were made about the war. It also time for another round of speculation as to where the war might be headed in the coming months.

Expect the unexpected – Female Ukrainian soldier

Differences of Opinion – Past & Present Performance
The most notable prediction that proved true about the war was ironically one made before it even began. American intelligence assessments of the Russian military posture regarding Ukraine proved to be spot on. The Biden administration provided information that a Russian invasion was imminent. At the time, many thought this was fear mongering, including Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. Then in the early hours of February 24^th, all hell broke loose over Ukraine. The American’s accurate prediction of the invasion has now been mostly forgotten, but it shows that combining human and electronic intelligence can correctly predict outcomes. Unfortunately, most predictions are little more than speculation. Predictions are supposed to be based on fact, whereas speculation is little more than opinion. It is not hard to understand why. Even the most well-connected analysts and reporters often lack credible information. That means relying on past performance to predict future outcomes.

Many analysts fell back on the Russian army’s reputation in predicting its eventual victory. The problem was that the Russians had not been involved in a war of this size or scale since 1945. The Ukrainian Army did not have much of a reputation at all. That influenced opinions of their fighting ability. The upshot was an overestimation of the Russian’s capabilities and an underestimation of the Ukrainians. After Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv, most should have been disabused of their assumptions that the Russian Army was a juggernaut that would steamroll the Ukrainians. The Russian military’s poor performance in the Battle of Kyiv was a harbinger of more problems to come. This did not stop analysts from once again predicting Russian victory as they made gains in their Donbas Offensive. For many, the mighty Russian steamroller had finally arrived. They were going to defeat the Ukrainians with artillery bombardments and missile strikes. This assumed the Russians had an infinite number of men and weaponry available, or at least enough to grind the Ukrainians down. It turned out they did not. The result was that while the Russians did make progress, the campaign came at great cost.

The war grinds on – Electrical transformer in Ukraine hit by Russian missile

Guesswork – Forecasting The Future
The predictions about Ukrainian performance have been wrong on too many occasions to enumerate. Most of these assumed that Ukrainian forces were so outnumbered and outgunned that they could not possibly hold out for very long. The reality is that they have done much better than that, and by doing so won several surprise victories. While the Ukrainian Army’s ability to defy predictions has been highly publicized, less has been said about those times when the Ukrainians fail to exceed expectations. This is what occurred in the aftermath of their breakthrough in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Predictions of further breakthroughs were made, some even believed that this would be the Russian Army’s breaking point.

When that did not happen, the predictions of a stalemate resurfaced. This has been aided by observations that the weather will prove too detrimental for either the Ukrainians or Russians to do much about. Campaigns were supposed to ebb with the onset of winter. A more realistic assessment is that operations are slowing down. Nevertheless, ferocious fighting is still taking place. This is especially true in the Donbas region where the Russians have been launching wave after wave of attacks on Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut. For their part, the Ukrainians are making a push for Svatoe. Both actions are proof that trying to forecast the future is guesswork.

Trying to predict what will happen in the coming months is extremely difficult. Perhaps more so than at other times in the war because weather will play an outsized role in the fighting. Weather forecasts are notoriously unreliable, particularly so in a land such as Ukraine that is given to extreme climatic conditions. One thing that can be said with some assurance is that the war is nowhere close to over. It will last at least through the winter and into the spring. Both sides will be reconstituting troops and weaponry. Most analysts believe this will be for spring offensives, but winter might just be the time for a surprise attack that has a greater chance of a breakthrough. This is truer for the Ukrainians than the Russians. The Ukrainians have the momentum on their side from the victories in Kherson and Kharkiv. Furthermore, the Russians are filling gaps in their ranks with raw recruits that have been reportedly undersupplied. If so, they may be vulnerable to an offensive.

The battle has just begun – Ukrainian soldiers ready for winter warfare

Great Expectations – Fantasy & Reality
Trying to predict what will happen in the coming months is extremely difficult. Perhaps more so than at other times in the war because weather will play an outsized role in the fighting. Weather forecasts are notoriously unreliable, particularly so in a land such as Ukraine that is given to extreme climatic conditions. One thing that can be said with some assurance is that the war is nowhere close to over. It will last at least through the winter and into the spring. Both sides will be reconstituting troops and weaponry. Most analysts believe this will be for spring offensives, but winter might just be the time for a surprise attack that has a greater chance of a breakthrough. This is truer for the Ukrainians than the Russians. The Ukrainians have the momentum on their side from the victories in Kherson and Kharkiv. Furthermore, the Russians are filling gaps in their ranks with raw recruits that have been reportedly undersupplied. If so, they may be vulnerable to an offensive.

As for the Russians, they will continue attacks on civilian infrastructure, the one aspect of the war where they have been successful this autumn. Russian forces are also likely to try some sort of ground offensive if for no other reason than the best defense is a good offense. Leaving raw recruits in the trenches and rickety barracks for months on end is a risky venture. Getting them on the move, even if in very limited offensive actions could alleviate concerns about low morale and the possibility of localized mutinies. Whatever happens on either side, we should be prepared for more of the unexpected. The only thing certain is that the war will continue to astonish and confound those who try to predict its ultimate outcomes.

Click here for: Act of Desperation – Russian Attacks on Ukraine Infrastructure (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #253)

Russia’s Counterproductive Conflict – The Battle of Bakhmut (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #241)

At a certain point that is only likely to be identified in retrospect, the Russian Army’s offensive operations in Ukraine became counterproductive. Some would say this was true from the start, considering how poorly they have performed throughout the war. The attempt to take Kyiv was a debacle from the start and ended in disaster. Even operations which were successful at the beginning, such as taking Kherson Province with hardly a fight, turned out to be unsustainable. The most successful Russian operation of the war, the spring-summer offensive in the Donbas region, now looks like a pyrrhic victory. The Russians basically lost what was left of their professional army in that campaign. At the same time, they expended massive quantities of weaponry and supplies in an all-out effort to gain territory that has proved to be of little value.

Occupying ruined cities such as Sievierodonetsk and Lyschansk have been yet another drain on human and material resources. A more judicious use of force with specific objectives on narrower fronts might have resulted in more success, but even that is debatable considering the lack of leadership, strategic planning, endemic corruption and low morale that plagues Russian forces. One would think that after so many failures the Russians would have learned their lesson. That is not the case because the Russians continue to make the same mistake of trying offensive operations that yield few results other than high casualty rates. The current Russian campaign to take the city of Bakhmut continues despite evidence of mass casualties.

Firing away – Ukrainian artillery near Bakhmut

Taking Offense – Searching For Success
Bakhmut is in the Donbas region, approximately 90 kilometers northeast of the city of Donetsk. The city had a population of 80,000 prior to the war, but due to months of artillery bombardments, three-quarters of the population is believed to have fled. It critical for the Russians to take Bakhmut if they hope to occupy all of Donetsk Province. The city lies on a major transport artery that controls access to the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Getting past Bakhmut has proved impossible for the Russians so far, this is despite artillery bombardments that began all the way back in May. Fighting has intensified over the past several weeks to the point that Bakhmut has become the Russian’s major, and at this point only objective before winter brings a temporary halt to offensive operations. The Russians have several ulterior motives besides Bakhmut’s value as a stepping-stone.

The city has become symbolic from the Russian perspective. If they can take it, this would show that Russian forces are still capable of offensive operations, something that been in doubt since their Donbas offensive ended at the beginning of July. The Kremlin needs a success, no matter how small or costly to continue selling the war back home. With Kherson looking more and more like it will soon be taken by the Ukrainians, Bakhmut has taken on a heightened importance. A successful offensive operation to take the city would be a much-needed distraction to focus the Russian people’s attention away from the loss of Kherson. 
Another reason for the push to take Bakhmut is that Wagner Group mercenaries are leading the effort.

Grim prospects – Yevgeny Prigozhin

Mercenary Forces – The Wagner Group
The Wagner Group is the brainchild of billionaire and long-time Putin crony Yevgeny Prigozhin. His mercenary forces are trying to succeed where the Russian Army has failed. Prigozhin is the prototypical regime figure who has a back story that proves truth is much stranger than fiction. A former convict who spent nine years in prison for robbery, Prigozhin once sold hot dogs on the street. He made a fortune through a catering business that gained him the nickname, “Putin’s Chef.” Prigozhin is the rare figure who can let loose a barrage of public criticism of the Russian military effort in Ukraine and get away with it. That is because he has the Kremlin’s blessing. Prigozhin is slavishly loyal to Putin, while cultivating his personal ambition to build a political power base for himself. He senses a potential opportunity with post-Putin Russia likely not that far away.

Right now, Putin needs all the help he can get to achieve a success before the onset of winter weather puts an end to any offensive operations. If Wagner Group forces can take Bakhmut, then Prigozhin’s public profile would get a major boost.  Prigozhin has already exercised his influence through his blistering criticism of Russian generals. One of those was the commander of Russia’s central military district, Alexander Lapin, who was subsequently removed from his post. Amplifying Prigozhin’s criticism is the Chechen warlord and perennial Putin favorite, Ramzan Kadyrov who publicly supports Prigozhin’s verbal broadsides at the Russian military command. Kadyrov senses that Prigozhin’s star is rising so it is not surprising he expresses his support.

Long rumored to be the founder and driving force behind the Wagner Group, a couple of months ago Prigozhin finally admitted that was indeed true. The Wagner Group has been notorious for their military actions propping up dictatorial regimes in Syria and Central Africa. Along the way they have been accused of committing war crimes with impunity. Wagner Group mercenaries have a reputation for being brutally effective. That is now on the line in the campaign to take Bakhmut. They are the driving force of an estimated 30,000 Russian troops fighting to take the city. There have been some limited successes, but after weeks of fighting and reports of heavy casualties the Wagner Group has been unable to dislodge the Ukrainian forces. The only result has been the usual Russian bloodbath.

Waiting & watching – Ukrainian soldier at the edge of Bakhmut

All For Nothing – War Among The Ruins
The Wagner Group is not providing most of the cannon fodder for the Battle of Bakhmut, but they are leading the fight. While Bakhmut has limited strategic potential at this point in the war, the ruined city means a great deal to the Kremlin’s war narrative. If Bakhmut falls, the Kremlin will promote this as a sign of success and greater one to come next year. The reality will be very different. Bakhmut is another example of a counterproductive military action by the Russians. Thousands will get killed for an objective that will likely turn out to be meaningless other than to keep Putin in power or advance the political prospects of one of his cronies. Battles such as the one taking place at Bakhmut come at great cost with few rewards. In that sense, the battle of Bakhmut is a microcosm of the counterproductive Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Click here for: Nature of the Beast – The Kremlin’s Path To Defeat At Kherson (The Russian Invasion of Ukraine #242)